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interpretation, plaintiff seamen will be able to raise the issue of whether the

seaman's conduct justified his discharge, regardless of whether any fault on
the shipowner's or shipmaster's part occasioned the seaman's improper
conduct.6 8 The Neathery decision thus is very broad and certainly will create
difficulties for parties attempting to limit the decision solely to cases involving
mutual fault.6 9
DouGLAs G. STANFORD

III.
A.

ANTITRUST LAW

& TRADE REGULATION

Authority of State Attorneys General to Bring Parens
Patriae Suits for Treble Damages Under the Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1976

Title III of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976'
grants state attorneys general standing to bring treble damage antitrust suits
on behalf of consumers injured by violations of the Sherman Act.' Congress
68. See 700 F.2d at 143 n.3 (Neathery court indicated that true issue in § 594 action is
whether seaman's conduct justified his discharge).
69. See id. at 143 (Neatherycourt stated that § 594 does not require seaman to be faultless
to recover under statute); text accompanying notes 66-68 (Neathery decision may affect ability
of shipowner to discharge seaman without liability even when seaman alone is at fault).
1. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1394
(1976) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 15c-h 1976 & Supp. V 1981). Title III of the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Act of 1976 authorizes state attorneys general to sue as parenspatriae for consumers injured
by antitrust violations. 15 U.S.C. § 15c (1976 & Supp. V 1981); see infra note 10 and accompanying text (parens patriae in title III means that states can sue as representative party for consumers); infra notes 3-6 and accompanying text (congressional purposes behind title III); see also
15 U.S.C. at § 1311-14 (title I of Hart-Scott-Rodino Act allows Justice Department to issue civil
investigative demands to investigate mergers, joint ventures, acquisitions or other related transactions that may lead to antitrust violations); Id. at § 18(a) (title II of Hart-Scott-Rodino Act requires reporting of all significant potential mergers and acquisitions to Justice Department and
Federal Trade Commission). See generally Kintner, Griffin & Goldston, The Hart-Scott-Rodino
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976: An Analysis, 46 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1 (1977) (discussion
of Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976); Scher, Emerging Issues Under the
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 679 (1977) (analysis of Hart-ScottRodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976).
2. See 15 U.S.C. § 15c (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (title III authorized state attorneys general
to sue in name of state as parenspatriaeon behalf of consumers injured by antitrust violations);
see also id §§ 1-7 (Sherman Act). Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that every contract
or conspiracy in restraint of trade between the states is illegal. Id. at § 1. Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides that any monopolization or conspiracy to monopolize trade is a felony. Id.
at § 2; see also id. at § 15 (Clayton Act allows persons injured in business or property by violations of Sherman Act to sue for treble damages).
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enacted title III to enhance consumer protection and remedies under the anti4
trust laws.3 To supplement lagging consumer enforcement of antitrust laws,
3. See H.R. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE AND
AD. NEWS 2572, 2573-74 (title III bolsters enforcement of antitrust laws by permitting
attorneys general to act as consumer advocates in enforcement of antitrust laws); S. REP. No.
803, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1976) (title III provides compensation for consumers injured by
antitrust laws and also deters future antitrust violations). The legislative history of title III indicates that Congress found that the existing antitrust laws did not adequately protect consumers
from antitrust violations. H.R. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-5, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE AND CoNG. AD. NEws 2572, 2573-74. For example, Congress noted that individual consumer antitrust suits are impractical because consumers usually sustain only small amounts of
damages from antitrust violations. Id. at 6, reprintedin 1976 U.S CODE AND CONG. AD. NEWS
2575-76; S. REP. No. 803, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 39-40. Congress acknowledged that since the
total damages consumers sustain from antitrust violations may be very large, the alternative to
individual consumer suits is class action suits. H.R. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted
in 1976 U.S. CODE AND CONG. AD. NEws 2572, 2575-76; S. REp. No. 803, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
39-40. Congress, however, determined that the procedural requirements of class actions often
render class actions difficult, if not impossible, to maintain. See H.R. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 6-8, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE AND CONG. AD. NEWS 2572, 2576-77 (problems of
notice and manageability seriously impair consumer's ability to bring class actions); see also FED.
R. Civ. P. 23 (class actions must be manageable and class members must receive individual notice
of class action whenever practicable); infra note 4 (analysis of procedural requirements for class
actions). Congress further determined that the lack of adequate means for enforcement of antitrust laws for consumers weakens the deterrent effect of the antitrust laws, thereby encouraging
future antitrust violations. H.R. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE AND CONG. An. NEws 2572, 2573-74. Moreover, Congress stated that antitrust violations
create high prices and inflation, further injuring consumers and the general economy of the states.
Id. at 3-4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE AND CONG. AD. NEws at 2573. Consequently, Congress
designed title III to supplement consumer antitrust suits by allowing states to take advantage
of title III's procedural innovations to bypass the burdensome procedural requirements of class
actions. See id. at 8, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE AND CONG. AD. NEWS at 2578 (title III allows
state attorneys generals to both represent consumers injured by antitrust violations and to avoid
manageability requirements of class actions); infra note 4 (title III permits notice by publication
and aggregate calculation of damages to bypass procedural requirements of class actions).
4. See H.R. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 7-8, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE AND
CONG. AD. NEws 2572, 2577 (consumer enforcement of antitrust laws is not effective because
consumers lack adequate means to enforce antitrust laws); supra note 3 (problems with consumer
enforcement of antitrust laws). Congress noted that the procedural requirements of class actions,
particularly the requirements that the actions be manageable and that class members receive individual notice when possible, often prevented private litigants from maintaining class actions.
H.R. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 607, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE AND CONG. AD.
NEws at 2576. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that class actions must
be manageable and that class members must receive individual notice of the class action whenever
possible. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D), (C)(2).
Title III provides for less stringent procedures than the procedures required in class actions
to satisfy the due process requirements that parties to an action receive notice of the action and
an opportunity to be heard in court. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 15c(2)(b), 15e (1976 & Supp. V 1981)
(title III provides for aggregate calculation of damages and for notice to class members by publication); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1950) (primary element of due process is parties' opportunity to be heard in court). Under title III, states may
notify consumers of an antitrust claim by publication, including radio and television broadcasts.
15 U.S.C. § 15c(b)(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). A court decision on a title III claim binds consumers who did not exclude themselves from the title III action after the state published notice
CONG.
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Congress modified the common lav doctrine of parens patriae5 in title III

to permit states to sue in lieu of consumers injured by antitrust violations. 6
At common law, a state could sue as parenspatriaeonly to protect the state's
quasi-sovereign interests in the physical and economic welfare of the people
of the state as a whole. 7 A quasi-sovereign interest is a direct state interest
in the welfare of the state's populace apart from the claims and interests of
individual state citizens." Consequently, a state merely enforcing the claims
of the action. Id. at § 15c(b)(3). Title III avoids the manageability requirements that plagued
consumer class action suits by providing for an aggregate calculation of damages. Id. § 15e.
Courts have discretion under Title III to use reasonable methods, such as statistical sampling
and computation of overcharges, in calculating damages. Id. Consumers that prove individual
damage claims may collect their share of the damages. Id. A court may distribute any damages
remaining after consumer claims have been satisfied, or may give the excess to the state. Id.;
see H.R. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE AND CONG. AD.
NEws 2572, 2585 (Congress intended when enacting title III that courts should use discretion
when distributing damages to benefit injured consumers).
5. See Malina & Blechman, ParensPatriaeSuits for Treble Damages Under The Antitrust
Laws, 65 N.W.U.L. REv. 193, 197 (1970) (parenspatriaewas term for King of England's royal
prerogative to exercise certain powers and duties in King's role as father of country). Under English
common law, the King's royal prerogative entailed the King's powers and duties to protect infants, lunatics and other mental incompetents of the realm. Id.; see Note, State Protection of
its Economy andEnvironment: ParensPatriceSuits ForDamages, 6 CoLUm. J. L. & Soc. PROBS.
411, 412 (1970) (parenspatriaetraditionally described sovereign's power to protect persons under
legal disability). In the United States the royal prerogative rests with the federal and state governments instead of the King. Malina & Blechman, supra, at 197. The concept of parens patriae
under American common law also includes a state's protection of state quais-sovereign interests.
Id. at 196-97; see Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600
(1982) (parens patriae under American law primarily concerns state protection of quasi-sovereign
interests); supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text (quasi sovereign interests involve state's interests in general welfare of state citizens). See generally Curtis, The Checkered Careerof Parens
Patriae: The State as Parent or Tyrant?, 25 DE PAUL L. REv. 895 (1976) (analysis of parens
patriae concept under English and American Law).
6. See H.R. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE AND
CONG. AD. NEws 2572, 2578 (state attorneys general bringing title III actions act as consumer
advocates in enforcement of antitrust laws).
7. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez 458 U.S. 592, 600-601
(1982) (states sue as parenspatriaeonly on behalf of state quasi-sovereign interests). Quasi-sovereign
interests include a state's interests in the environment, the general economy, or the health of
state citizens. See Georgia v. Pennsylvania Ry. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 450-51 (1945) (state has quasisovereign interest in preventing economic discrimination against state residents); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237-38 (1907) (state has quasi-sovereign interest in preventing
poisonous fumes from entering state); Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 145 (1902) (state has
quasi-sovereign interest in protecting flow of rivers into state); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208,
241 (1901) (state has quasi-sovereign interest in preventing other states from polluting state's rivers).
See generally Malina & Blechman, supra note 5, at 202-12 (analysis of state quasi-sovereign interests).
8. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez 458 U.S. 592, 600 (1982)
(state cannot sue as parenspatriceif state has only nominal interest in action or is merely representative party). Quasi-sovereign interests derive from a state's duty as sovereign to protect the state's
people. Id. at 602. Under the federal system, states enforcing quasi-sovereign interests invoke
the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Id. at 601; see Georgia v. Pennsylvania Ry. Co.,
324 U.S. 439, 450 (1945) (original jurisdiction provides peaceful mechanism for settling disputes
between states over state quasi-sovereign interests). States acting solely on behalf of individual
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of individual citizens or acting as a nominal representative of a group of citizens
is not asserting a quasi-sovereign interest. 9 Title III expanded the concept of
parens patriaeby allowing states to sue on behalf of individual citizens even
though no state quasi-sovereign interest was at issue.'" Although title III provides that a state's attorney general is to enforce consumer antitrust claims
by bringing parens patriae actions in the name of the state, litigants have

changed the validity of title III parenspatriaeactions because title III permits
a state to represent in court the legal claims of individual citizens. "' In Pennsylvania v. Mid-Atlantic Toyota Distributors,Inc.'2 the Fourth Circuit con-

sidered whether a state attorney general has the authority to bring a title III
parenspatriaeaction even though the action primarily benefits consumers.

3

In Mid-Atlantic Toyota, the attorneys general of Delaware, Maryland,
Pennsylvania, Virginia and West Virginia, and the Corporation Counsel for
the District of Columbia brought title III actions in the District Court for
the District of Maryland, against Mid-Atlantic Toyota Distributors, Inc., for
conspiring to fix the price of Toyotas. 14 At trial, Mid-Atlantic Toyota moved

to dismiss the attorneys general of Delaware, Maryland, and Pennsylvania,
and the Corporation Counsel for the District of Columbia (Attorneys General),
contending that the Attorneys General lacked authority to bring title III acstate'citizens, therefore, are merely enforcing claims which the individual citizens themselves could
bring, and not a quasi-sovereign interest which invokes the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court to protect a state's direct interest in the well-being of the state. See Oklahoma ex rel.
Johnson v. Cook, 304 U.S. 387, 394 (1938) (quasi-sovereign concept does not extend to action
that states bring solely for benefit of individual citizens); North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S.
365, 373-76 (1923) (state cannot assert or enforce individual claims of state citizens against another
state); cf. California v. Frito Lay Inc., 474 F.2d 774, 777 (9th Cir.) (state does not have quasisovereign interest in enforcing consumer antitrust claims), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973). But
see infra note 51 (Congress effectively overruled Frito-Lay decision by enacting title III to permit
states to sue as parenspatriaefor consumers injured by antitrust violations).
9. See supranote 8 and accompanying text (state quasi-sovereign interests are distinct from
claims and interests of individual state citizens).
10. See 15 U.S.C. § 15c (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (title III authorizes state attorneys general
to bring parenspatriaesuits on behalf of consumers injured by antitrust violations); In re Montgomery County Real Estate Antitrust Litig., 452 F. Supp. 54, 59-60 (D. Md. 1978) (state need
not allege damage to state quasi-sovereign interest in order to bring title III actions).
11. See Tennessee ex rel. Leech v. Highland Memorial Cemetery, 489 F. Supp. 65, 68 (E.D.
Tenn. 1980) (title III does not violate constitutional requirement of standing in federal courts);
In re Montgomery County Real Estate Antitrust Litig., 452 F. Supp. 54, 60 (D. Md. 1978) (title
III does not violate constitutional requirement of standing in federal courts); see also U.S. CoNsT.
art. III, § 2 (parties having standing in federal courts if case or controversy exists between parties).
12. 704 F.2d 125 (4th Cir. 1983).
13. Id. at 127.
14. See id. (title III actions of states involved in Mid-Atlantic Toyota consolidated in District
Court of Maryland by Judicial Panel for Multidistrict Litigation); see also 15 U.S.C. § 15g(2)
(1976 & Supp. V 1981) (District of Columbia is state for purposes of title III because term state
in title III means any territory or possession of United States). Title III defines attorney general
to mean the chief legal officer of a state, including the Corporation Counsel for the District
of Columbia. 15 U.S.C. § 15g(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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tions absent specific state authorization for the actions. 5 The district court
denied Mid-Atlantic Toyota's motion to dismiss, holding that title III authorized
a state's attorney general to bring a title III action unless the state expressly
prohibited its attorney general from bringing the action.' 6 Alternatively, the
district court held that state grants of authority to the Attorneys General empowered the Attorneys General to maintain title III actions." Mid-Atlantic
Toyota appealed the district court's decision to the Fourth Circuit on the question of whether the Attorneys General could prosecute title III actions.' 8
On appeal, Mid-Atlantic Toyota challenged both of the district court's
rationales for holding that the Attorneys General could bring title III actions.' 9
First, Mid-Atlantic Toyota argued that Congress could not redefine or expand the authority of a state attorney general without unconstitutionally infringing upon the state's sovereign prerogative to define the powers of state
officers. " Mid-Atlantic Toyota contended that the Tenth Amendment to the

15. See In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litig., 525 F. Supp. 1265, 1286 (D. Md.),
modified, 541 F. Supp. 62, 63 (D. Md. 1981), aff'd, 704 F.2d 125 (4th Cir. 1983). At trial in
Mid-Atlantic Toyota, Mid-Atlantic Toyota did not challenge the authority of the West Virginia
Attorney General to bring title III actions because the West Virginia state legislature gave the
Attorney General express authority to prosecute title III actions. See 541 F. Supp. at 63 n.23a;
W. VA. CODE § 47-18-17(a) (1980). Mid-Atlantic Toyota also did not challenge the parenspatriae
authority of the Virginia Attorney General because the Judicial Panel for Multidistrict Litigation
consolidated the Virginia action in In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota after the district court rejected
Mid-Atlantic Toyota's motion to dismiss. See Pennsylvania v. Mid-Atlantic Toyota Distrib., Inc.,
704 F.2d 125, 127 (4th Cir. 1983).
16. See In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litig., 525 F. Supp. 1265, 1286 (D. Md.),
modified, 541 F. Supp. 62 (D. Md. 1981), aff'd, 704 F.2d 125 (4th Cir. 1983). In holding that
title III permitted state attorneys general to bring parenspatriae actions, the district court in
Mid-Atlantic Toyota followed dicta in another Fourth Circuit case. Id.; United States v. Colonial
Chevrolet Corp., 629 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 913 (1981). In Colonial
Chevrolet, the Virginia Attorney General sought to require the United States Attorney General
to provide the Virginia Attorney General with information concerning a title III parens patriae
claim against Colonial Chevrolet. 629 F.2d at 946; see 15 U.S.C. § 15f(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)
(United States Attorney General shall provide state attorney general with information relevant
to title III actions upon state attorney general's request). In holding that the United States Attorey General must produce the requested information, the Fourth Circuit remarked that through
title III Congress invested state attorneys general with authority to maintain parens patriae actions on behalf of consumers. See 629 F.2d at 950. The Colonial Chevrolet court's language
is dicta however, because the Fourth Circuit was referring to Congress' intention that title III
provide an effective advocate for consumer antitrust claims as creating a need for cooperation
between state attorneys general and the United States Attorney General, rather than the separate
question of whether state attorneys general have authority to proceed under title III. Id.
17. In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litig., 541 F. Supp. 62, 63 (D. Md.), modifying,
525 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Md. 1981), aff'd, 704 F.2d 125 (4th Cir. 1983); see infra note 36 and
accompanying text (statutes involved in Mid-Atlantic Toyota).
18. See 704 F.2d at 127 (defendants in Mid-Atlantic Toyota made interlocutory appeal to
Fourth Circuit on question whether attorneys general involved in Mid-Atlantic Toyota could bring
title III parens patriae actions).
19. See 704 F.2d at 128.
20. Id. at 128-29.
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Constitution forbids Congress from interfering with state grants of authority
to state officials by protecting the states' position as sovereign entities in the
federal system. 2 The Tenth Amendment reserves for the state all powers which
the Constitution does not give to the federal government.2 2 Accordingly, MidAtlantic Toyota claimed that the authority of the23Attorneys General to proceed under Title III must come from state law.
Second, Mid-Atlantic Toyota argued that the Attorneys General lacked
authority to bring the title III actions under state law because none of the
states involved granted its attorney general the authority to prosecute title III
actions. 21 Mid-Atlantic Toyota contended that the states could sue as parens
25
patriae under common law only to protect state quasi-sovereign interests.
Since title III actions involve the claims of individual citizens rather than state
quasi-sovereign interests, Mid-Atlantic Toyota argued that title III actions were
outside the scope of common law parenspatriae actions. 26 Absent common
law authority, Mid-Atlantic Toyota contended that an attorney general could
proceed with a title III action only under state constitutional or statutory
authority. 27 Mid-Atlantic Toyota claimed that the constitutional and statutory
grants of authority to the Attorneys General limited the Attorneys General
to bringing actions involving the state's proprietary interests as a consumer,

or state quasi-sovereign interests. 28 Because title III actions do not involve
21. See id. The Tenth Amendment reserves all powers to the state that the Constitution
did not give to the federal government. U.S. CONST. amend. X. Mid-Atlantic Toyota argued
that NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery stands for the proposition that the Tenth Amendment
protects the federal system by forbidding Congress from defining the authority of state officials.
Brief for Appellants at 9-11, Pennsylvania v. Mid-Atlantic Toyota Distrib., Inc., 704 F.2d 125
(4th Cir. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellants]; see National League of Cities v. Usery,
426 U.S. 833, 853 (1976). In Usery, the Supreme Court held that Congress did not have the
authority to set minimum wage standards for state employees because the power to set wages
for state employees was an attribute of state sovereignty protected by the Tenth Amendment.
See 426 U.S. at 843-46. Consequently, Mid-Atlantic Toyota argued that under Usery Congress
could not expand or redefine the authority of a state's attorney general. Brief for Appellants
at 10. But see 704 F.2d at 130 n.9 (Mid-Atlantic Toyota court stated that title III does not redefine
authority of state attorneys general but merely creates new right of action in federal courts).
22. U.S. CONST. amend. X.

23. See 704 F.2d at 128 (Mid-Atlantic Toyota argued that authority of attorneys general
to bring title III actions must come from state law because Congress cannot authorize state attorneys general to act under title III).
24. Id. at 129.
25. Id.; see supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text (at common law states sued as parens
patriaeonly to vindicate state quasi-sovereign interests in general welfare of state and populace).
26. 704 F.2d at 129; see supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text (state does not assert quasisovereign interests by merely enforcing claims of individual citizens).
27. 704 F.2d at 129.
28. Id. In Mid-Atlantic Toyota, the defendants argued that the constitutional and statutory
grants of authority to the attorneys general involved in Mid-Atlantic Toyota (Attorneys General)
limited the Attorneys Generalto bringing actions on behalf of the states. Brief for Appellants,
supra note 21, at 15-16, 25-26, 28-30, 36-37. Mid-Atlantic Toyota claimed that only actions involving a state's proprietary interests as a consumer, or state quasi-sovereign interests are actions
on behalf of the state because the state has a direct interest in state proprietary or quasi-sovereign
interests. Id.
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state proprietary or quasi-sovereign interests, Mid-Atlantic Toyota contended

that the Attorneys General
did not have authority under state law to pro29
secute title III actions.
The Mid-Atlantic Toyota court rejected both of Mid-Atlantic Toyota's
arguments and affirmed that the district court's denial of Mid-Atlantic Toyota's
motion to dismiss.3 ° The Mid-Atlantic Toyota court did not address the district
court's holding that federal law authorized the Attorneys General to bring
title III actions." Instead, the court focused solely on whether the Attorneys
General could bring title III actions pursuant to state laws.32 In considering
Mid-Atlantic Toyota's argument that the Attorneys General could not bring
title III actions under state law, the court agreed with Mid-Atlantic Toyota
that the Attorneys General had no common law authority to bring title III
actions.33 The court, however, rejected Mid-Atlantic Toyota's argument that
the Attorneys General could not bring title III actions pursuant to either state
constitutional or state statutory grants of authority.34 As support for its position, the court noted that each of the states' grant of authority to the Attorneys General were similar because each state had a statutory or constitutional provision that empowered its attorney general to bring actions on behalf
of the state's interests.3" The court also noted that title III was merely a pro29. 704 F.2d at 129.
30. 704 F.2d at 129-30; see 15 U.S.C. § 15c (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (title III creates right
of action for states to sue as parens patriae for consumers injured by antitrust violations).
31. See 704 F.2d at 128-29. Since the Mid-Atlantic Toyota court held that state law authorized
the Attorneys General to bring title III actions, the court did not have to consider Mid-Atlantic
Toyota's argument that Congress could not define the authority of a state official. See id. at
129; infra note 38 and accompanying text (court's acceptance of Mid-Atlantic Toyota's argument
that Congress lacks power to expand authority of state attorneys general does not affect question
whether attorneys general may prosecute title III actions pursuant to state law).
32. 704 F.2d at 129.
33. See id. at 129 n.8 (Mid-Atlantic Toyota court accepted Mid-Atlantic Toyota's argument that title III's right of action expands common law parenspatriae actions); supra note 7
and accompanying text (common law parenspatriaesuits involve state quasi-sovereign interests).
34. See 704 F.2d at 129 (Mid-Atlantic Toyota court rejected Mid-Atlantic Toyota's contention that state constitutional and statutory grants of authority to Attorneys General limited Attorneys General to bringing actions vindicating state proprietary or quasi-sovereign interests).
35. See 704 F.2d at 130. The Mid-Atlantic Toyota court acknowledged that the statutes
defining the powers of the Attorneys General all possess similar language. Id. For example, the
District of Columbia Code provides that the Corporation Counsel for the District of Columbia
has authority to conduct the law business of the District. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-361 (1981).
The law business of the District of Cohumbia includes suits by or against the District, and representation of public interests. Id. The Delaware Code provides that the Delaware Attorney General
may prosecute violations of state and federal antitrust laws on behalf of the state and state institutions. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2105 (Supp. 1983) (Delaware Antitrust Act). Similarly,
the Maryland Constitution states that the Maryland Attorney General may bring actions on the
part of or in the interests of the state. See MD. CoNsT. art. V, § 3(a)(2). Furthermore, Pennsylvania's Commonwealth Attorney's Act provides that the Attorney General shall represent Pennsylvania and her citizens in federal antitrust suits. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 732-204(c) (Purdon Supp. 1982). Accordingly, the Mid-Atlantic Toyota court determined that essentially all the
attorneys general involved in Mid-Atlantic Toyota had the authority to represent their respective
jurisdiction's interests in litigation. 704 F.2d at 130.
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cedural device creating a federal right of action for the states.3 6 The MidAtlantic Toyota court then articulated two theories for holding that the Attorneys General may bring a title III action pursuant to the Attorneys General's
authority under state law to represent the state's interests.37
In developing the first theory for holding that the Attorneys General may
maintain title III actions pursuant to state constitutional or statutory grants

of authority, the Fourth Circuit maintained that state law permitted the Attorneys General to sue in the name of each state on a federally created cause
of action.3 8 The Mid-Atlantic Toyota court stated that the Attorneys General
bring title III actions in the name of the state, and thus on behalf of the state,

even though the action primarily benefitted consumers, because title III created
the action for the states and designated the states as the proper party litigants
to bring the action. 39 Consequently, the court rejected Mid-Atlantic Toyota's

argument that a state's attorney general brings title III actions on behalf of
consumers and not on behalf of the state."0 Since title III created a cause of
action for the states, the Fourth Circuit held that an attorney general bringing
a title III action is representing the state's interests by enforcing a state cause

of action."
As a second theory in support of the holding that the Attorneys General
may maintain title III actions pursuant to state constitutional or statutory grants
of authority, the Mid-Atlantic Toyota court determined that the authority of
an attorney general to represent his state's interests in litigations included the

authority to bring actions protecting the state's public interests., 2 The court
rejected Mid-Atlantic Toyota's argument that under the statutes involved the
36. 704 F.2d at 128. The Mid-Atlantic Toyota court stated that Congress designed title
III merely to create a new right of action for the states in the federal courts without affecting
the substantive requirements for establishing liability under antitrust law. Id. The court noted
that title III provided that a state's attorney general brings the action in the name of the state.
Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (title III actions are in state's name even
though state is representative party for consumers); infra notes 53 and accompanying text (title
III's legislative history shows that Congress intended title III to change antitrust law procedurally
rather than substantively).
37. See 704 F.2d at 130-32.
38. Id. at 130. The Mid-Atlantic Toyota court noted that the court's acceptance of the
defendant's argument that Congress could not redefine the authority of a state attorney general
was not relevant either to Congress' power to grant standing in the federal courts or to create
new rights of action in the federal courts. Id. at 130 n.9. The Fourth Circuit determined that
Congress was not redefining or expanding the authority of state attorneys general by creating
for the states a new right of action if the state attorneys general had the power under state law
to prosecute new federal rights of action. See id.
39. See id. at 130-31. Since title III provides that states bring title III actions in the name
of the state, the Mid-Atlantic Toyota court determined that title III actions exist in favor of
the state regardless of whether the state is acting in a representative capacity for consumers. Id.;
see Oklahoma ex rel. Johnson v. Cook, 304 U.S. 387, 390-91 (1938) (state may bring statutory
action even if state is only nominal plaintiff provided statute names state as proper party).
40. 704 F.2d at 130-31.
41. 704 F.2d at 131; see 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (state attorneys general
bring title III actions in name of state).
42. See 704 F.2d at 131-32.
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states only had an interest in an action if state proprietary or-quasi-sovereign
interests were at issue.43 The court stated that states have a legitimate interest
in fostering a healthy economy by protecting state citizens from antitrust violations even though the state interest is not a quasi-sovereign interest independent of the claims of individual citizens. 44 Additionally, the Fourth Circuit
noted that state attorneys general have broad discretion in determining where
state interests lie.41 Since title III actions involve a legitimate public interest,
the Fourth Circuit held that title III actions are well within an attorney general's
authority to exercise broad discretion to protect state public interests.4 6
After discussing the two theories for holding that the authority of the
Attorneys General to represent their respective state's interests in litigation
included the authority to bring title III actions, the Mid-Atlantic Toyota court
noted that title III allows states to win substantial damages for deposit in the
state treasuries.4 7 The court stated that undoubtedly all of the states involved
in Mid-Atlantic Toyota had empowered their respective attorneys general to
bring federal actions which would secure for the state substantial damage
awards.4 The Mid-Atlantic Toyota court therefore, declared that the Attorneys
General's authority to bring title III actions was consistent with the Attorneys
General's authority to instigate suits to recover damages for their respective
49
states.
The Mid-Atlantic Toyota court's holding that the Attorneys General had
43. Id. at 132; see supra note 28 and accompanying text (defendants in Mid-Atlantic Toyota
argued that Attorneys General could only represent state proprietary or quasi-sovereign interests
pursuant to Attorneys General's authority to bring actions on behalf of state).
44. 704 F.2d at 132. The Supreme Court has held that a state may have a legitimate public
interest in an action even though that interest is not a quasi-sovereign interest which invokes
the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. See Oklahoma ex rel. Johnson v. Cook, 304 U.S.
387, 394-96 (1938) (Court upheld Oklahoma statute providing that state could sue to liquidate
assets of insolvent banks for distribution to creditors). In Johnson, the Supreme Court stated
that Oklahoma had a legitimate economic interest in protecting state citizens who were creditors
of insolvent banks. 304 U.S. at 394-96. The Court, however, held that even though Oklahoma
had a legitimate economic interest in protecting citizen creditors of insolvent banks, the interest
was not a state quasi-sovereign interest independent of the claims of individual citizens. Id. at
396. Since the action did not involve a state quasi-sovereign interest, the Court denied Oklahoma
original jurisdiction under the common law doctrine of parenspatriae. Id.; see supra notes 7-9
and accompanying text (states enforcing quasi-sovereign interests invoke original jurisdiction of
Supreme Court). Notwithstanding the Johnson holding, a state attorney general may bring a
title III action pursuant to the attorney general's authority to represent the state's public interest
even though the interest is not a quasi-sovereign interest because states suing under Title III are
not attempting to invoke the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 15 U.S.C. § 15c (1976
& Supp. V 1981); see supra note 10 and accompanying text (title III gives states standing to
sue as parenspatriae on behalf of consumers injured by antitrust violations although no state
quasi-sovereign interest is at issue).
45. 704 F.2d at 132 n.15; see infra note 84 and accompanying text (most courts hold that
state attorneys general have broad discretionary powers to determine public interest).
46. 704 F.2d at 132.
47. Id.; see supra note 4 (state retains amount of damages in title III actions remaining
after consumer claims have been satisfied).
48. 704 F.2d at 132.
49. Id.
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authority under state law to prosecute title III actions effectuates the congressional purpose of title III to allow state attorneys general to represent con-

sumers injured by antitrust violations." Title III was a legislative response
to cases holding that states could not bring common law parens patriaesuits
on behalf of injured consumers.' By permitting states to bring suits on behalf

of consumers injured by antitrust violations, Congress intended courts to allow
state attorneys general to bring cases like Mid-Atlantic Toyota.5 2 Additionally, the legislative history of title III indicates that Congress designed title
III as a procedural device that gave states standing to sue for consumers in-

50. See id. (Mid-Atlantic Toyota court held that Attorneys General had authority to bring
title III parens patriae actions on behalf of consumers); supra note 3 and accompanying text
(Congress enacted title III to bolster lagging consumer enforcement of antitrust laws).
51. See-California v. Frito Lay, Inc., 474 F.2d 774, 778 (9th Cir.) (California could not
bring common law parenspatriae suit on behalf of consumers injured by antitrust violations),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973); H.R. REP. No. 449, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprintedin 1976
U.S. CODE AND CoNG. AD. Naws 2572, 2577-78 (Congress specifically stated that title III overrules Frito Lay by permitting state attorneys general to act for consumers in enforcement of
antitrust laws). In Frito Lay, the California Attorney General sued Frito Lay, alleging that Frito
Lay violated § I of the Sherman Act by fixing the prices of snack foods. 474 F.2d at 775. The
California Attorney General attempted to bring the suit as parenspatriaeon behalf of California
residents injured by Frito Lay's alleged violation of the Sherman Act. Id. At trial, Frito Lay
moved to dismiss the action, claiming that the California Attorney General could not bring the
parens patriae action because no state quasi-sovereign interests were at issue. See California v.
Frito Lay, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 977, 979 (C.D. Calif. 1971), rev'd, 474 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1973).
The district court denied Frito Lay's motion to dismiss, holding that California could sue as
parens patriae for California residents because the state had a duty to provide an economy free
from antitrust violations for its residents. Id. at 981-82. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed
the district court's denial of Frito Lay's motion to dismiss, holding that California's action was
not aparenspatriaeaction because the California Attorney General sued for injuries to individual
citizens rather than a state quasi-sovereign interest. 474 F.2d at 775, 776-77; see Alfred L. Snapp
& Son v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600-601 (1982) (states can sue as parenspatriae
under common law only on behalf of state quasi-sovereign interests); In re Motor Vehicle Air
Pollution Control Equip; 52 F.R.D. 398, 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (court held that parenspatriae
suit for consumers injured by antitrust violations was not valid substitute for consumer class
action); Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitation Corp., 309 F.
Supp. 1053, 1062-63 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (court held that common law parens patriaesuit for consumers injured by antitrust violations was without merit and not a valid substitute for consumer
class action). Although the Frito Lay court granted Frito Lay's motion to dismiss, the court
stated in dicta that allowing states to bring parenspatriae suits on behalf of consumers injured
by antitrust violations was a suitable solution to the problems of enforcing antitrust laws and
protecting consumers from antitrust violations. 474 F.2d at 777. Accordingly, the court invited
Congress to authorize stateparenspatriaeactions under federal antitrust laws. See id. (authority
for state parenspatriaesuits must come from legislation and rule making rather than from judicial
improvisation); supra note 4 (consumer class actions are inadequate as means of enforcing consumer's antitrust claims).
52. See In re Montgomery County Real Estate Antitrust Litig., 452 F. Supp. 54, 59 (D.
Md. 1978) (Congress intended title III to allow type of parens patriae action which Frito Lay
disallowed); H.R. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE AND CoNG.
An. NEws 2572, 2578 (purpose of title III is to permit state attorneys general to sue on behalf
of consumers in enforcement of antitrust laws).
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jured by antitrust violations. 3 The Fourth Circuit's holding in Mid-Atlantic
Toyota, therefore, furthers the congressional intent of title III by interpreting
title III as a procedural device creating a right of action under the federal
antitrust laws for the states.54
Although the Supreme Court has not considered whether a state attorney
general has authority to maintain title III parens patriae actions, one other
circuit court has agreed explicitly with the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of
title III concerning the authority of an attorney general to bring a title III
action. 5 The Fifth Circuit, in Texas v. Scott & Fetzer Co.,56 examined whether
the Texas Attorney General had authority to bring title III actions. 7 In Scott
& Fetzer, the Texas Attorney General brought suit against the defendant Scott
and Fetzer, alleging that the defendant illegally maintained high prices for
vacuum cleaners which the defendant sold. Scott and Fetzer challenged the
authority of the Texas Attorney General to bring the title III action, claiming
that the Texas Code59 limited the Texas Attomey General to recovering damages
that Texas sustained in its proprietary capacity.6" The Texas Code authorized
the Texas Attorney General to bring actions on behalf of the state of Texas

53. See H.R. REP. No. 499, 94TH CONG., 2d SESS. 9, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE AND
AD. NEws 2572, 2578-79 (title III provides alternative remedy for enforcement of existing
substantive antitrust claims without creating new substantive liability under antitrust law); see
SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 39 (title III merely creates an effective mechanism for consumer
recoveries under anti-trust laws); supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text (Congress intended title
III to supplement consumer enforcement of and protection under antitrust laws). But see 122
Cong. Rec. 29,372 (1977) (remarks of Senator Hart) (title III has more than procedural effect
on antitrust law by easing substantive requirements for proving causation of damage under antitrust law). See generally, Scher, supra note I, at 722-24 (totality of title III's legislative history
suggests that Congress intended title III to be procedural device creating new state cause of action
without affecting substantive requirements of antitrust law).
54. See 704 F.2d at 128; see also supra note 53 (Congress designed title III as procedural
device to give states cause of action without changing substantive requirements for liability under
antitrust laws). Like the Fourth Circuit in Mid-Atlantic Toyota, the Supreme Court has interpreted title III as a procedural device having no affect on substantive antitrust law. See Illinois
Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 734 n.14 (1977) (title III only created new remedy for enforcement of existing substantive antitrust claims); see also Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330,
344 n.7 (1979) (Congress enacted title III to authorize states to sue as parenspatriae for consumers injured by antitrust violations).
55. See Texas v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 709 F.2d 1024, 1028 (5th Cir. 1983) (Texas Attorney
General has authority to prosecute title III actions).
56. 709 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. 1983).
57. See id. at 1024-28 (Jolly, J., dissenting).
58. See id. at 1029 n.3.
59. TEx. Bus & CoM. CODE ANN. § 15.40(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982) (Texas Attorney General
may bring suit on behalf of state to recover damages for violations of federal antitrust laws).
60. 709 F.2d at 1025-26. In Scott & Fetzer, the defendants argued that title III only allows
state attorneys general who have express authority under state law to bring parenspatriaeactions
to bring title III actions. Id. Since Texas' Attorney General lacked express legislative authority
to bring title III actions, Scott & Fetzer claimed that the Attorney General could not bring title
III actions. Id.
CONG.
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to recover damages for violations of the federal antitrust laws . 6 The district

court denied the defendant's motion
to dismiss the case but certified the issue
62
Circuit.
Fifth
the
to
appeal
for
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit rejected Scott and Fetzer's argument that
the Texas Code limited the Texas Attorney General to bringing only actions

involving state proprietary or quasi-sovereign interests, and instead held that
the Texas Code authorized the Attorney General to bring title III actions on

behalf of the state.6 3 After noting-that the Texas Code was very similar to
the statutes at issue in Mid-Atlantic Toyota, " the Scott & Fetzer court adopted
the Mid-Atlantic Toyota court's rationale, reasoning that the similarity of the

statutes involved in the two cases rendered the Mid-Atlantic Toyota rationale
entirely applicable to Scott & Fetzer.6 In particular, the Fifth Circuit agreed
with the Mid-Atlantic Toyota court that states bring title III actions on behalf
of the state even though the state is enforcing the claims of individual citizens."6
61. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.40(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982) (Texas Attorney
General may recover damages for violations of federal antitrust laws on behalf of state, state
subdivision or tax-supported institutions).
62. 709 F.2d at 1024-25.
63. Id. at 1025-28.
64. Id. at 1026-27.; see TEx. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 1540(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982) (Texas
Attorney General has authority to bring actions on behalf of state to recover damages for violations of federal antitrust laws); supra note 35 and accompanying text (Attorneys General involved
in Mid-Atlantic Toyota have statutory and constitutional authority to bring suits on behalf of
their respective jurisdiction's interests).
65. See 709 F.2d at 1026-27 (Scott & Fetzer court quoted extensively from Mid-Atlantic
Toyota opinion).
66. See 709 F.2d at 1027. In claiming that the Texas Code did not authorize the Texas
Attorney General to bring a title III parens patriae suit, the dissent in Scott & Fetzer rejected
the court's adoption of the Mid-Atlantic Toyota holding. Id. at 1028-29 (Jolly, J., dissenting).
The dissent argued that states bring title III parens patriae suits for the benefit of consumers.
Id. Consequently, the dissent contended that title III actions are not on behalf of the state but
on behalf of consumers. Id. The dissent also argued that a state's interest in protecting the state's
economy does not transform title III actions into actions on behalf of the state because a state
bringing a title III action is not suing directly for harm to the state's general economy but for
financial harm to individual consumers. Id. at 1030. Consequently, the dissent maintained that
Texas' Attorney General could not bring a title III action without express authorization from
the Texas legislature to seek recovery of damages for individuals. Id. at 1030-3 1. By maintaining
that the Texas Attorney General must have specific legislative authorization to proceed with a
title III action, the Scott & Fetzer dissent effectively rejected the Mid-Atlantic Toyota court's
rationale that an attorney general may bring title III actions pursuant to his authority to represent
his state's interests in litigation. See id. at 1030 (dissent argued that Mid-Atlantic Toyota mistakenly
held that actions on behalf of state include parens patriaeactions). The dissent, however, failed
to recognize that title III actions are not subject to the common law restriction of parenspatriae
actions, namely that parenspatriae suits must involve a quasi-sovereign interest. See supra note
10 and accompanying text (title III permits states to sue as parens patriae although no quasisovereign interests are at issue); cf. 709 F.2d at 1030 (Scott & Fetzer dissent argued that majority
holding erases historical basis for parens patriae actions). Since title III actions do not involve
state quasi-sovereign interests, a state does not have to show a state interest apart from the claims
of individual citizens, or direct injury to the state's economy. See In re Montgomery County
Real Estate Antitrust Litig., 452 F. Supp. 54, 60 (D. Md. 1978) (states need not allege injury
to general economy to bring title III actions because Congress intended to permit states to sue

19841

FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

The Fifth Circuit stated that Texas' title III action was on behalf of the state
because the Texas Attorney General brought the action on behalf of all Texans injured through Scott and Fetzer's restraint of trade. 67 The Fifth Circuit

then remanded the case to the district court for trial on the merits."
In addition to the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, two federal district courts
and one state court have upheld the authority of state attorneys general to
bring title III actions.69 Like the constitutional and statutory authority at issue
for injured consumers regardless of injury to general economy). Consequently, the Scott & Fetzer
dissent erred in concluding that since title III actions do not involve state interests independent
of the interests of state citizens the Texas Attorney General lacks authority to bring the actions.
Cf. id. at 58-60 (In re Montgomery County court rejected defendants argument that title III
incorporated historical concept and interpretation of common law parens patriae).
67. 709 F.2d at 1027.
68. Id. at 1028.
69. See Iowa v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,873, at 72,359 (S.D.
Iowa 1982) (Iowa Attorney General has authority under Iowa law to prosecute title III actions);
New Mexico v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,439, at 75,149 (D.N.M. 1981)
(New Mexico Attorney General has authority under New Mexico law to prosecute title III actions); Clark Oil and Refining Corp. v. Ashcroft, 639 S.W.2d 594, 597 (Mo. 1982) (en banc)
(Missouri Attorney General has authority under Missouri law to prosecute title III actions).
In Iowa v. Scott & Fetzer Co., the Iowa Attorney General brought a title III parenspatriae
action against the defendant Scott & Fetzer. 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,873, at 72,358-59.
Scott & Fetzer moved to dismiss the action, claiming that the Iowa Attorney General lacked
authority under Iowa law to bring parenspatriae actions upon the claims of individual Iowa
citizens. Id. The Iowa Code provides that the Iowa Attorney General may bring all suits if the
state may be a party to, or have an interest in the action. IowA CODE § 13.2(2) (1982 Supp.).
The district court denied Scott and Fetzer's motion to dismiss, holding that since the state is
a party to a title III action the Attorney General may bring the action under the Iowa Code.
1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,873, at 72,358-60. In addition, the district court held that the
Iowa Attorney General could bring the title III action pursuant to the Attorney General's broad
discretionary authority to bring suits in the interests of the state. Id. at 72,359.
Similarly, in New Mexico v. Scott & Fetzer Co., the New Mexico Attorney General brought
a title III parens patriaeaction against the defendant Scott & Fetzer. 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
64,439, at 75,148. Scott & Fetzer moved to dismiss the action, claiming that the New Mexico
Attorney General did not have the authority under New Mexico law to prosecute title III actions.
Id. The district court stated that the New Mexico Attorney General had the authority to bring
actions on behalf of the state when the attorney general believed that the action was in the interests of New Mexico. Id. at 75,149; see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 8-5-2 (1978) (New Mexico Attorney
General has authority to bring action if state may be party to or interested in action and if in
Attorney General's judgment state interests require such action). The district court stated that
the Attorney General brought the title IlI action in the name of New Mexico for the benefit
of state citizens. 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,439, at 75,149. The district court further stated
that New Mexico had a legitimate interest in protecting state citizens from violations of antitrust
laws. Id. Consequently, the court denied Scott & Fetzer's motion to dismiss, holding that the
New Mexico Attorney General may bring title III actions pursuant to the Attorney General's
authority to bring an action on behalf of the state to protect an interest of the state. Id.
Additionally, in Clark Oil & Refining Co. v. Ashcroft, the Missouri Attorney General originally
brought a title III parenspatrice action against Clark Oil in federal district court. 639 S.W.2d
at 595. In the federal district court, Clark Oil argued that the Missouri Attorney General lacked
authority to bring title III actions and moved to dismiss the action. Id. The district court denied
the motion to dismiss, holding that the Missouri Attorney General could prosecute title III actions as a matter of federal law. Id. at 595-96. Clark Oil made an interlocutory appeal to the
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in Mid-Atlantic Toyota, the legislative grants of authority to the attorneys
general in the lower court cases generally empowered a state's attorney general
to bring actions on behalf of the state, or to bring actions in which the state
may be a party or have an interest.7 ° Accordingly, each court that has allowed
a state attorney general to bring a title III action has adopted essentially the
same rationale that the Fourth Circuit used in Mid-Atlantic Toyota.7' Like

the Fourth Circuit in Mid-Atlantic Toyota, the lower courts uniformly have
held that a state can bring title III actions on behalf of a state even though
the state is a representative party for the claims of individual citizens. 72 FurEighth Circuit but the Eighth Circuit turned down the appeal. Id. at 595; see 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)
(1976) (litigants may immediately appeal orders regarding controlling issues in case subject to
discretion of court). Consequently, Clark Oil sought declaratory relief in the Missouri Circuit
Court of Cole County. 639 S.W.2d at 595. The Circuit Court entered a declaratory judgment
for Clark Oil, ruling that Missouri law did not authorize specifically the Missouri Attorney General
to bring title III actions. Id. at 594. The Missouri Attorney General then appealed to the Missouri
Supreme Court. Id. On appeal, Clark Oil argued that the Attorney General could not bring a
title III parenspatriae action because the action involved the claims of individual citizens rather
than state interests. Id. at 596. The Missouri Supreme Court, however, determined that state
law authorized the Attorney General to bring actions on behalf of the interests of the state. Id.
see Mo. REv. STAT. § 27.060 (1969) (Missouri Attorney General may bring suits in name of and
on behalf of state to protect interests of state); Mo. REv. STAT. § 416.061 (1979) (Missouri Attorney General may represent state in actions under any federal antitrust statute). The Missouri
court stated that title III actions are actions on behalf of the state because the Attorney General
is enforcing the rights of all Missouri citizens injured by antitrust violations. 639 S.W.2d at 596.
The court also stated that title III actions enforce the public right to an economy free from antitrust violations. Id. at 597. Consequently, the Clark court reversed the circuit court, holding
that the Missouri Attorney General may bring title III actions pursuant to his authority to bring
actions to protect the interests of the state. Id.
70. See D.D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-361 (1981) (Corporation Counsel for District of Columbia
may represent all law business of district); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2105 (Supp. 1983) (Delaware
Attorney General may prosecute violations of state and federal antitrust laws on behalf of state
and state institutions); IowA CODE § 13.2(2) (1967) (Iowa Attorney General may bring action
if state may be party to such action or if interests of state require such action); MD. CONST.
art V., § 3(a)(2) (Maryland Attorney General may bring actions on part of or in interests of
state); Mo. Rav. STAT. § 27.060 (1969) (Missouri Attorney General may bring suits in name of
state to protect interests of state); Mo. REv. STAT. § 416.061 (1979) (Missouri Attorney General
may represent state in actions under any federal antitrust law); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 8-5-2 (1978)
(New Mexico Attorney General may bring action if state may be party to or interested in action
or if action involves state public interests); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71 § 732-204(c) (Purdon Supp.
1982) (Pennsylvania Attorney General shall represent state and state citizens in federal antitrust suits).
71. See supra note 69 and accompanying text (federal district and state courts have held
that state attorney general brings title III actions on behalf of state and to protect state public
interests in securing economy free from antitrust violations); see also Pennsylvania v. Mid-Atlantic
Toyota, 704 F.2d 125, 130-32 (4th Cir. 1983) (Attorneys General involved in Mid-Atlantic Toyota
brought title III actions pursuant to authority to bring actions either on behalf of state or in
protection of public interests).
72. See Iowa v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,873 at 72,359 (S.D.
Iowa 1982) (state is designated as real party in interest in title III actions); New Mexico v. Scott
& Fetzer Co., 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,439, at 75,149 (D.N.M. 1981) (New Mexico Attorney General may bring title III actions even though title III actions primarily benefit consumers because title III action is in name of state); Clark Oil & Refining Corp. v. Ashcroft,
639 S.W.2d 594, 596 (Mo. 1982) (en banc) (title III action is not merely on behalf of individual
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thermore, the lower courts have determined, as did the Mid-Atlantic Toyota

court, that the states have a legitimate interest in protecting state citizens and
the state economy from antitrust violations."' The lower court holdings,
therefore, are consistent with the Mid-Atlantic Toyota court's holding that
state attorneys general may bring title III actions pursuant to the attorneys
general's authority to represent their state's interests by bringing
actions on
74

behalf of the state or by protecting state public interests.
In addition to the other courts' decisions which agreed with the MidAtlantic Toyota holding that the Attorneys General may bring title III actions, the generally favorable reaction of the legislatures to title III actions
supports the Mid-Atlantic Toyota court's holding.1 5 The attitude of a state
legislature toward a title III action is of probative value when determining
whether the state legislature intended its attorney general to have the authority to bring title III actions.76 Although none of the states involved in MidAtlantic Toyota had granted express authority to their respective attorneys
general to bring title III actions, 77 none of the states indicated disapproval
of title III actions. 7 8 Congress placed an opt-out provision in title III which
consumers but on behalf of state protecting all Missouri citizens injured by antitrust violations);
see also supra note 69 (discussion of lower court decisions that are consistent with Mid-Atlantic
Toyota holding that state attorneys general bring tide III actions in name of state even though
state is representative party in title III actions); supranote 39 and accompanying text (Mid-Atlantic
Toyota court's holding that state attorneys general bring tire III actions on behalf of state).
73. See Iowa v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,873, at 72,359 (S.D.
Iowa 1982) (Iowa Attorney General may prosecute title III actions pursuant to his broad discretionary authority to represent state public interests); New Mexico v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 1981-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,439, at 75,150 (D.N.M. 1982) (title III actions involve legitimate state
interest in securing economy free from antitrust violations); Clark Oil & Refining Co. v. Ashcroft,
639 S.W.2d 594, 598 (Mo. 1982) (en banc) (title III actions protect public right to economy free
from antitrust violations); see also supra note 69 (discussion of lower court decisions that are
consistent with Mid-Atlantic Toyota court's rationale that attorneys general bring title III actions
to protect state public interests).
74. See supra notes 71-73 (lower courts use essentially same rationale to uphold authority
of attorneys general to bring title III actions as Fourth Circuit used in Mid-Atlantic Toyota).
75. See Pennsylvania v. Mid-Atlantic Toyota, 704 F.2d 125, 130 (4th Cir. 1983) (state
legislative grants of authority to Attorneys General authorize Attorneys General to bring title
III actions); infra notes 77-81 and accompanying text (legislatures of states involved in Mid-Atlantic
Toyota generally approve of title III parenspatriae actions).
76. See New Mexico v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,439 at 75, 149
(D.N.M. 1981) (court cited New Mexico legislature's lack of objection to title III actions as support for holding that Attorney General may bring title III action); Clark Oil & Refining Co.
v. Ashcroft, 639 S.W.2d 594, 597 (Md. 1982) (en banc) (court refers to Missouri legislature's
aquiescence to title III actions as support for holding that Attorney General may bring title III
actions); cf. Iowa v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,873 at 72,359 (S.D.
Iowa 1982) (court cited legislative intent to grant Iowa Attorney General broad power to represent public interests as support for holding that Attorney General may bring title III actions).
77. 704 F.2d at 129 n.7.
78. Cf. id. at 132 (Mid-Atlantic Toyota court stated that state legislatures undoubtedly
have authorized their attorneys general to bring title III actions that permit recovery of monetary
damages for deposit in state treasuries). Two states have enacted legislation authorizing the states'
attorneys general to bring tide III parens patriae actions for violations of state antitrust laws.
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provided that title III applied in all states except states expressly rejecting title
III." In general, courts have inferred from a state legislature's failure to optout of title III that the state legislature had no objection to the state's attorney general bringing title III actions." Moreover, the District of Columbia
and Delaware supplemented title III by passing legislation authorizing their
respective attorneys general to bring parenspatriaesuits for violation of state
antitrust laws." The state legislature's inaction towards title III despite the
opt-out provision, and state legislative expansion of the title III parenspatriae
concept to cover state antitrust laws, therefore, indicates that state legislatures
generally approve of their respective state's attorney general bringing parens
patriae actions under title III.82
Since the legislatures of the states involved in the Mid-Atlantic Toyota
litigation had not objected to title III actions, the Mid-Atlantic Toyota holding
that the Attorneys General could bring the actions is the most rational holding
because a holding for the defendants would unnecessarily restrict the authority of the Attorneys General to protect the public interests. 8 3 Generally, courts
recognize that attorneys general have broad discretionary powers in determining public interests. Courts, therefore, are hesitant to restrict an attorney
See CONN. GEN . STAT. ANN. § 35-32 (West 1981); W.

VA. CODE

§ 47-18-17(a) (1980). Eleven

other states have passed legislation complementing title III by allowing the states' attorneys general
to sue as parens patriae for violations of state antitrust laws. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §
16760 (West Supp. 1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2108 (Supp. 1983); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-4507
(1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542-22 (West 1983); HAW. REv. STAT. § 480-14 (Supp. 1982); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 93, § 9 (Michie/Law Coop (Supp. 1983)); NEv. REv. STAT. 598A.160 (1981);
OR. Rav. STAT. § 646.775 (1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-36-12 (Supp. 1983); S.D. CohP. LAWS

§ 37-1-23 to -32 (1983); VA. CODE § 59.1-9.15 (1983).
79. See 15 U.S.C. § 15(h) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (title III applies in all states which do
not reject title III).
80. See New Mexico v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,439, at 75,149
(D.N.M. 1981) (court stated that legislature had no objection to attorney general maintaining
title III actions since legislature did not opt-out of title III); Clark Oil & Refining Corp. v. Ashcroft,
639 S.W.2d 594, 597 (Mo. 1982) (en banc) (court assumed legislature's failure to opt-out of title
III indicated legislative support for title III actions even though legislature did not expressly authorize
attorney general to bring title III actions).
81. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-4507 (1981) (Corporation Counsel for District of Columbia
has authority to bring parens patriaeactions for violations of District of Columbia's antitrust
laws); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2108 (Supp. 1980) (Delaware's Attorney General may bring parens
patriae actions for violations of Delaware's antitrust laws).
82. See supra text accompanying note 80 (courts generally hold that absence of state statutes
forbidding attorneys general from maintaining parenspatriaeactions under title III indicates that
states have no objection to states' attorneys general bring title III actions); see also D.C. CODE
ANN. § 28-4507 (1981) (Corporation Counsel for District of Columbia may bring parenspatriae
ANN.

actions for violations of District of Columbia's antitrust laws); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2108
(Supp. 1983) (Delaware's Attorney General has authority to bring parenspatriaeactions for violations of Delaware's antitrust laws).
83. See infra notes 84-88 and accompanying text (holding for defendants in Mid-Atlantic
Toyota would be wrongful restriction of attorneys general's broad discretion to protect state public
interests).
84. See Florida ax rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d 266, 268-69 (5th Cir. 1976) (attorneys general generally have as much authority as necessary to represent the public interest);
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general's determination that a particular suit is necessary to protect the public
interest unless the suit is clearly not in the public interest.85 Accordingly, Congress chose a state's attorney general as the proper state official to bring title

III actions because of the attorney general's traditionally broad powers to protect the public interest.8 6 The lack of a negative response to title III actions
by the state legislatures suggests that an attorney general is not abusing his

discretionary powers when bringing a title III action. 87 A ruling for Mid-Atlantic
Toyota, however, would restrict the Attorneys General's broad authority to
protect the public interest by requiring each state to pass specific legislation
authorizing its attorney general to proceed under title III before the attorney

general could bring title III actions. 88 Since title III actions further the public
interest, 8 9 a holding for the defendants in Mid-Atlantic Toyota would conflict
with Congress' intent in title III that state attorneys general could bring title
III actions to protect public interests. 98
The Fourth Circuit's holding in Mid-Atlantic Toyota that the Attorneys

General may bring title III actions pursuant to their authority to bring actions
on behalf of the state and in protection of state public interests effectuates
the congressional purpose in enacting title III of enhancing consumer protec-

tion under the antitrust laws. 9 Congress intended title III to create for the
see also Iowa v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,873, at 72,359 (S.D. Iowa
1982) (Iowa Attorney General has broad discretionary power to bring actions to protect public
interests).
85. See New Mexico v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,439, at 75,149
(D.N.M. 1982) (court would not challenge attorney general's discretion in deciding that title III
actions involve state public interests); Michigan State Chiropractice Ass'n v. Kelley, 79 Mich.
App. 789, _, 262 N.W.2d 676, 677 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (court should not disturb attorney
general's discretionary decision to bring actions concerning public interest unless action is clearly
not in public interest).
86. See S. REP. No. 803, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 n.1. The Senate determined that a state
attorney general is the best representative for consumers in antitrust cases because a state attorney general is usually an elected official whose primary duty is to protect the health and welfare
of state citizens. Id.; see In Re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig., 1972 Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,966,
at 92,033 (D.D.C. 1972) (state attorney general is best representative of retail consumers because
historically attorney general had common law authority to act on behalf of general welfare of
populace).
87. See supra text accompanying note 80 (legislative inaction regarding title III despite optout provision implies that state legislatures have no objection to title 111).
88. Cf. 704 F.2d at 128 (Mid-Atlantic Toyota court rejected defendants' argument that
states must specifically grant authority to attorneys general to proceed under title Ill before attorneys general may bring title III actions).
89. See Texas v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 709 F.2d 1024, 1027 (5th Cir. 1983) (Texas Attorney
General vindicates rights of Texas citizens by bringing title III action); New Mexico v. Scott &
Fetzer Co., 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,439, at 75,149 (D.N.M. 1981) (title III actions protect
public interest in securing economy free from antitrust violations).
90. See supra text accompanying note 86 (Congress intended for attorney general to bring
title III actions because Attorneys General have broad authority to represent public interests).
91. See supra text accompanying notes 50-54 (Mid-Atlantic Toyota holding that Attorneys
General may bring title III actions furthers congressional intent for title III to provide consumers
with effective remedy under antitrust laws); see also 704 F.2d at 130-32 (Mid-Atlantic Toyota
court held that Attorneys General may bring title Ill actions pursuant to their authority to repre-
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states a new cause of action in the federal courts.9 2 Accordingly, the MidAtlantic Toyota court interpreted title III as a procedural device giving states

a right of action for consumers and permitting state attorneys general to bring
title III parenspatriaeactions without meeting the common law requirements
for parenspatriae actions. 93 Furthermore, by ruling that the state grants of
authority to the Attorneys General included the authority to bring title III

actions, the Mid-Atlantic Toyota opinion complimented state legislative approval of title III actions and did not restrict the broad discretionary powers
of state attorneys general. 94 Moreover, like Mid-Atlantic Toyota, each court

that has considered the issue whether a state attorney general has authority
to bring a title III action has upheld the authority of the attorney general

to prosecute title III actions.95 The Fourth Circuit's holding in Mid-Atlantic
Toyota therefore, permits state attorneys general to continue using the Hart-

Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act96 to provide consumers with an effective remedy under the antitrust laws.
JOHN CALHOUN MORROW

B.

Recovery of Treble Damages Under the North Carolina
Unfair Trade PracticesAct: The Importance of Pleading

Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act)' prohibits unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
sent jurisdictions' interests in litigation); supra note 3 and accompanying text (Congress enacted
title III to provide consumers with effective remedy under antitrust laws).
92. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text (title III was legislative reaction to cases
preventing states from suing as parens patriae for consumers injured by antitrust violations);
see also H.R. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE AND CONG.
AD. NEws 2572, 2578 (Congress designed title III to give states right of action to sue for consumers injured by antitrust violations).
93. See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text (Mid-Atlantic Toyota court held that
Attorneys General may bring title III actions even though no state quasi-sovereign interests were
at issue); see also 704 F.2d at 127 (Mid-Atlantic Toyota court interpreted title III as procedural
device creating for states right of action in federal court).
94. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (state legislatures have evidenced no objection to their respective attorney general prosecuting title III actions).
95. See supra notes 65, 69 and accompanying text (courts using essentially same rationale
as Mid-Atlantic Toyota court for holding state attorney general may prosecute title III action).
96. Cf. supra note 88 and accompanying text (holding for defendants in Mid-Atlantic Toyota
would require states to pass specific legislation authorizing attorneys general to bring title III
actions before attorneys general could proceed under title III).
1. Federal Trade Commission Act §§ 1-18, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1982). Congress enacted
the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) following the Supreme Court's decision in Standard Oil Co. v. United States. 221 U.S. 1 (1910). In Standard Oil, the United States charged
the defendants with conspiring to restrain trade and commerce in the petroleum industry in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 30, 31; see Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). Section
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commerce. 2 Congress originally enacted the FTC Act in 1914 as part of the
over-all scheme of antitrust laws.3 Section 5 of the FTC Act granted the newly
created Federal Trade Commission (Commission) 4 considerable latitude to strike
down commercial anticompetitive practices.' In 1938, Congress amended the
FTC Act to allow the Commission to protect consumers from unfair or
misleading practices. 6 In addition to the equitable prospective relief afforded
1 provides that every contract, combination, or conspiracy that restrains interstate commerce
is a felony. See Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1. Although § 1 of the Sherman Act contained
no requirement that a court find a restraint of trade or commerce unreasonable, the Standard
Oil Court held that the Sherman Act should be read "in the light of reason." 221 U.S. at 64-65;
see Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1. Congress feared that the Standard Oil rule of reason would
weaken antitrust enforcement by entrusting adjudication of alleged antitrust law violations to
the subjective standards of individual court members. See S. REP. No. 1326, 63d Cong., 3rd
Sess. 10 (1913), reprintedin 5 E. KINTNER, THE LEGISLATIVE HIsToRY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST
LAWS AND RELATED STATuTEs,

3736 (1978) (rule of reason allows individual court members to

make rather than administer law). Congress therefore enacted the FTC Act, which broadened
the federal government's antitrust enforcement powers by allowing the Federal Trade Commission to enjoin unfair methods of competition before such methods resulted in restraint of trade.
See Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 45a (1982); FTC v. Raladam Co. 283
U.S. 643, 647 (1931) (FTC Act's objective is to stop unfair methods of competition in their
incipiency).
2. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 45a (1982). Section 5 of the original
FTC Act prohibited only unfair methods of competition. Federal Trade Commission Act, ch.
311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 45a (1982)). Congress explicitly
declined to define "unfair" by enumerating particular practices that would constitute unfair methods
of competition. See FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239-40 (1971). Congress
believed that no definition of unfair could incorporate all of the practices Congress intended
to proscribe. See S. REP. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1914) (unfair practices in commerce
are too numerous and too variable to define); H.R. REP. No. 1142, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1914)
(impossible to frame definitions that encompass all unfair practices).
3. Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (1982)). The Sherman Act prohibits monopolies and contracts, combinations,
or conspiracies that restrain interstate commerce. See Sherman Act §§ 1-7, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(original version at ch. 647, §§ 1-7, 26 Stat. 209, 209-10 (1890)). The Clayton Act regulates price
discrimination, exclusive dealing, and mergers. See Clayton Act §§ 1-8, 10-16, 26, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 12, 13, 14-21, 22-27 (1982), 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (1982) (original version at ch. 323, §§ 1-26,
38 Stat. 730, 730-40 (1914)). The Sherman Act, the FTC Act, and the Clayton Act comprise
the core of federal antitrust policy. See M. HOWARD, ANTrrRusT AND TRADE REGULATiONS 49 (1983).
4. See 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1982). The Federal Trade Commission (Commission) is an independent
regulatory agency whose five members are appointed by the president for staggered seven-year
terms. Federal Trade Commission Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1982). Congress established the Commission as an expert body to obtain information from businesses, make investigations and issue
reports, and issue cease and desist orders to prevent unfair methods of competition in commerce.
M. HOWARD, supra note 3, at 25.
5. See Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719-20 (1914) (current
version at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982)); FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972)
(Commission may consider public values in determining whether practice is unfair); FTC v. Brown
Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 321 (1966) (Commission has broad powers to declare trade practices
unfair); FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bros., Inc., 291 U.S. 304, 310 (1934) (Commission's power to
issue cease and desist orders is not restricted to methods of competition forbidden at common
law or potential Sherman Act violations).
6. Wheeler-Lea Amendment, Pub. L. No. 447, §§ 1-5, 52 Stat. 111 (1938). The WheelerLea Amendment repudiated the Supreme Court's decision in FTC v. Raladam Co., in which
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by section 5 of the FTC Act, 7 the Federal Trade Commission Improvement

Act of 19758 authorizes the Commission to bring civil actions to redress consumer injury. 9 Neither statute, however, provides a cause of action to private

parties." ° Consumers and commercial entities therefore must look to state
statutes to determine what private rights of action exist for deceptive acts or
practices in commerce."

North Carolina is one of forty-two states that have enacted deceptive trade
practices statutes which expressly grant private rights of action to consumers.

2

the Commission had attempted to enjoin deceptive advertising practices without specifically finding that the advertising harmed competitors. See 283 U.S. 643, 646 (1931). The Raladam Court
held that unfair trade methods did not constitute per se unfair methods of competition. Id. at
649. The Raladam Court denied enforcement of the Commission's order because neither the order
nor evidence showed injury to competition. Id. at 652-53.
7. See Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 45b (1982). Section 5(b) of
the FTC Act sets forth a procedure by which the Commission issues and serves a complaint upon
any person, partnership, or corporation whom the Commission believes has violated the provisions of § 5(a). See id. The Commission then conducts a hearing, after which the Commission
may issue a cease and desist order if the Commission finds that the act or practice in question
violated the provisions of the FTC Act. Id.
8. Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1975, 15 U.S.C. §§ 57-58 (1982). The
Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1975 authorizes the Commission to issue interpretive rulings and regulations prohibiting specific acts or practices in commerce. Id. § 57.
9. Id. § 57. The Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1975 empowers the Commission to sue in a district court or a state court of competent jurisdiction for relief, which includes contract rescission or reformation, money refunds, return of property, and actual damages.
Id. § 57b(a)-(b) (1982).
10. See Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1982) (Commission may
issue cease and desist order against whomever Commission has reason to believe has violated
§ 5); Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(m), 15 U.S.C. § 45m (1982) (Commission may commence civil action to recover civil penalty); Federal Trade Commission Act § 20, 15 U.S.C. §
57b(a) (1982) (Commission may commence civil action against persons who violate rules respecting unfair or deceptive acts or practices that are promulgated under FTC Act); see also Holloway
v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (legislative history and underlying
policy of FTC Act mandates public enforcement of FTC Act).
11. See FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349, 351 (1941) (applicability of § 5 of the FTC
Act limited to acts in interstate commerce). Forty-nine states, the District of Columbia, Guam,
Puerto Rico, and the United States Virgin Islands have enacted deceptive trade practices statutes
that provide means to combat unfair trade practices or acts. Laeffer & Lipson, ConsumerActions
Against Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices:The Private Uses of FederalTrade Commission
Jurisprudence,48 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 521,531 (1980) (citing FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, FACT
SHEET, STATE LEGISLATION TO COMBAT UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES 1 (rev. Nov. 1979)). The state

deceptive trade practices statutes reflect great diversity with respect to proper enforcement authority,
regulation-issuing bodies, private actions, minimum damages, multiple damages, punitive damages,
equitable relief, class actions, and attorneys' fees. See id. at 560-64 app. Because states traditionally are the principal authority for exercising police power to protect public interests, state
deceptive trade practices statutes most efficiently address unfair trade acts or practices at the
local level. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE STATES 29 (1970)

(combined national and state action appropriately can deal with all consumer problems and interests).
12. See Laeffer & Lipson, supra note 11, at 531 app.; N.C. GEN. STAT. 75-16 (1977). Arizona
and Delaware courts have construed their respective statutes, which do not provide expressly
for private actions, to grant implied rights of action. See Selinger v. Freeway Mobile Home Sales,
Inc., 110 Ariz. 573, 576, 521 P.2d 1119, 1122 (1974) (court believes statute inferentially supplies
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In addition to granting private rights of action to consumers, the North Carolina
Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTP Act)' 3 mandates that injured parties received
treble damages."' Furthermore, the UTP Act provides relief to commercial
entities as. well as to consumers.'I The panoply of relief provided by the UTP
Act, however, has produced some anomolous results. Specifically, because
of an apparent aversion to the treble damages remedy as a replacement for
traditional common-law contract and tort remedies, courts have been reluctant to recognize violations of the UTP Act with respect to private actions
brought in a commercial context.' 6 In Atlantic Purchasers,Inc. v. Aircraft
private right of action to mobile home purchaser against seller); Young v. Joyce, 351 A.2d 857,
859 (Del. 1975) (reason and logic dictate that house purchaser may bring action under statute
that should be construed liberally).
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-1 to -56 (1977). The North Carolina legislature enacted the
UTP Act in 1969, incorporating the FTC Act's broad proscription against "unfair or deceptive
acts or practices." See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1977) (North Carolina proscription against
unfair or deceptive acts or practices); Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 543, 276 S.E.2d 397,
400 (1981) (background and history of UTP Act).
14. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (1977). The North Carolina legislature intended to provide
an effective private cause of action for injured consumers because common-law remedies often
had proved ineffective. Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. at -,
276 S.E.2d at 400.
15. See N.C. Gm. STAT. § 75-1.1(b) (1977). The original statute stated that the purpose
of the legislation was to declare and provide the means to maintain ethical standards of dealing
between businesses as well as between businesses and consumers. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1. 1(b)
(1969) (repealed 1977). The North Carolina legislature subsequently replaced § 75-1.1(b) with
a general statutory definition of commerce. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1. 1(b) (1977). North Carolina
courts apply the § 75-1.1(a) prohibition against unfair and deceptive practices in commercial,
as well as consumer actions. See Johnson v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 300 N.C. 247, 261-62,
266 S.E.2d 610, 620 (1980) (shopping center developer's action for unfair and deceptive acts with
respect to commercial loan commitment is within purview of § 75-1.1).
16. See Santana, Inc. v. Levi Strauss and Co., 674 F.2d 269, 275 (4th Cir. 1982). The
Santana court affirmed the district court's decision on a common-law fraud issue, but refused
to address the statutory unfair trade practice claim. 1d. Although both causes of action arose
from the same transaction, the Santana court held that North Carolina law did not apply to
the statutory unfair trade practice claim. Id. at 271, 275; see United Roasters, Inc. v. ColgatePalmolive Co., 649 F.2d 985, 992 (4th Cir.) (breach of contract neither unfair nor deceptive
absent proof of unfairness or deception at time of contract formation), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1054 (1981); Johnson v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 300 N.C. 247, _, 266 S.E.2d 610, 622-23
(1980) (mortgage broker's failure to notify shopping center developers of intent to repudiate loan
was neither unfair nor deceptive); see also Comment, The Trouble with Trebles: What Violates
G.S. § 75-1.1, 5 CAMPBELL L. REV. 119, 153 (1982) (lack of consciousness of commercial role
of statute creates ambiguity, vagueness, and fear of treble damages remedy among courts)
[hereinafter cited as Trebles]. The North Carolina courts' characterization of the UTP Act as
consumer protection legislation explains the North Carolina courts' willingness to apply the UTP
Act provisions to actions brought by consumers. See Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539,
,
276 S.E.2d 397, 403 (1981). In Marshall v. Miller, the North Carolina Supreme Court stated
that the effect of a defendant's conduct on a consumer is the relevant factor in determining whether
an act or practice is unfair or deceptive. Id. The Marshall court expressly described the UTP
Act as consumer protection legislation. 1d. at -,
276 S.E.2d at 400. The Marshall court further stated that the North Carolina legislature enacted the UTP Act to provide an effective cause
of action for aggrieved consumers. Id. at -, 276 S.E.2d at 400. See generally Note, Consumer
Protection and Unfair Competition in North Carolina-The 1969 Legislation, 48 N.C. L. REv.
896 (1970) (discussion of UTP Act background and purposes) [hereinafter cited as 1969 Legislation].
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Sales, Inc.,' 7 the Fourth Circuit held that the treble damages mandate of the
UTP Act did not apply to a commercial aircraft buyer who had been awarded
actual and punitive damages on common-law fraud and breach of express
warranty claims. 8
In Atlantic Purchasers,Stella Mars Inn, Ltd. and its wholly owned subsidiary, Atlantic Purchasers, Inc., brought a diversity action in federal district
court against Aircraft Sales, Inc. and its sole stockholder for fraud and breach
of express warranty.' 9 Stella Marls' allegations of fraud and breach of express
warranty arose out of Aircraft Sales' sale of an airplane to Atlantic Purchasers
pursuant to a lease purchase agreement. 20 Following trial at which Stella Maris
presented evidence 2' the jury returned a special verdict. 22 The jury found that
the defendants had knowingly and willfully misrepresented the condition of
the airplane with the intent to induce Stella Maris' reliance on the
misrepresentations. 23 Consequently, the jury found that Stella Mars sustained $31,000 in actual damages. 2 4 The jury further found that the fraudulent
nature of the defendants' representations entitled Stella Maris to recover $15,000
in punitive damages. 25 When the district court instructed Stella Maris to submit a damages claim pursuant to the verdict, Stella Mars invoked the
UTP Act, 26 claiming treble damages pursuant to sections 75-1.127 and
17. 705 F.2d 712 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 155 (1983).
18. Id. at 718.
19. Id. at 714. In a federal court diversity action, state law governs disposition of substantive matters, but federal law governs procedural issues. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470-71
(1965).
20. 705 F.2d at 714.
21. Id. In Atlantic Purchasers,Stella Mars presented evidence which indicated that the
defendants had operated the airplane's engines for many more hours than the defendants represented
and that the defendants had not performed the necessary airworthiness inspections prior to sale.
Id. Furthermore, Stella Mars presented evidence that the defendants had altered the log books
to substantiate their misrepresentations. Id. The defendants neither took the stand as witnesses
nor denied under oath Stella Mars' allegations of misrepresentation. Id. at 719.
22. Id. at 718-19.
23. Id. at 719.
24. Id.
25. Id. Under North Carolina law, a plaintiff who demonstrates actionable fraud may receive
punitive damages. Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105, 113-14, 229 S.E.2d 297,
218 S.E.2d 342, 344 (1975) (general
302 (1976). But see Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, -,
rule in North Carolina is that plaintiff ordinarily may not recover punitive damages in action
for fraud). Newton did not expressly overrule Hardy, but Newton stands as the North Carolina
Supreme Court's more recent decision on whether a plaintiff who demonstrates actionable fraud
may receive punitive damages. See Newton, 291 N.C. at 113-14, 229 S.E.2d at 302.
26. 705 F.2d at 714-15; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-1.1, -16 (1977). The Fourth Circuit noted
in Atlantic Purchasersthat Stella Maris neither used nor referred to the UTP Act prior to the
district court's instruction to submit a damages claim. 705 F.2d at 715 n.2. In the dissent, Senior
Circuit Judge Bryan stated that the defendants had received repeated notice of their treble damage
accountability before and after the jury's verdict. Id. at 720 (Bryan, J., dissenting). Judge Bryan,
however, did not clarify whether the defendants had received explicit notice of their potential
liability under the UTP Act, or whether the existence of the statute and various North Carolina
Supreme Court decisions provided notice of potential liability under the UTP Act. See id.
27. See 705 F.2d at 714-15; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1977). The predecessor to § 75-1.1,

19841

FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

75-16.28 The district court denied Stella Maris' motion to amend its complaint
pursuant to rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" and refused
to award treble damages.3 0 The district court then entered judgment for the
amount awarded by the jury.31 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the district court's decision. 2
The Fourth Circuit held that the district court's refusal to treble the
damages did not constitute an abuse of discretion under rule 54(c) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 3 Rule 54(c) provides that the prevailing party receive
the relief to which he is entitled whether or not the prevailing party requested
the relief in his pleadings. 3 4 The Fourth Circuit agreed with Stella Maris that
the jury's special verdict would have supported a finding that Aircraft Sales
had violated section 75-1.1 of the UTP Act, 35 which would have entitled Stella
Maris to treble damages pursuant to section 75-16 of the UTP Act .3 6 The Fourth
Circuit denied recovery of treble damages, however, on the grounds that Stella
Maris' failure to notify Aircraft Sales of the possible liability for treble damages
prejudiced Aircraft Sales. 37 Because the Fourth Circuit believed that rule 54(c)
which was in effect when the defendants in Atlantic Purchasersalleged that the fraud and breach
of express warranty occurred, declared unlawful unfair or deceptive acts or practices in trade
or commerce. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(a) (1969) (amended 1977).
28. See 705 F.2d at 714-15; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (1977). Section 75-16 mandates the
award of treble damages to parties injured in violation of the UTP Act. See id.
29. See 705 F.2d at 715; FED. R. Cirv. P. 15(a). Rule 15(a) permits parties to amend a
complaint at the court's discretion. See id. Rule 15(a) directs the court to allow amendment when
justice requires. See id.
30. 705 F.2d at 715. In addition to denying Stella Mars' motion to amend its complaint,
the Atlantic Purchasersdistrict court denied the defendants' motions to set aside the verdict and
to grant a new trial. Id.
31. Id. Before entering judgment, the Atlantic Purchasersdistrict court asked Stella Maris
and the defendants if they would agree to a new trial with supplemental pleading and preparation. Id. Stella Maris and the defendants could not agree on the terms for a new trial. Id.
32. Id. at 714.
33. Id. at 717; see FED. R. Crv. P. 54(c).
34. FED. R. Crv. P. 54(c). The Fourth Circuit limited its review of the Atlantic Purchasers
district court decision to consideration of whether the district court abused its discretion in refusing to grant treble damage relief pursuant to rule 54(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
705 F.2d at 717. In support of its limited scope of review, the Atlantic Purchaserscourt cited
Albemarle PaperCo. v. Moody, which held that a reviewing court may reverse a district court's
decision pursuant to rule 54(c) only for abuse of discretion. Id.; see Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 424 (1975).
35. 705 F.2d at 716. In Atlantic Purchasers,the Fourth Circuit stated that the jury's specific
findings regarding Aircraft Sales' representations about the airplane's condition and SteUa Maris'
reliance on the misrepresentations encompassed the elements of fraud. Id.; see Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105, -,
229 S.E.2d 297, 302 (1976) (finding of fraud results
from finding of willful intent to deceive). The Fourth Circuit noted that the commission of fraud,
as found by the jury, constituted a violation of § 75-1.1 of the UTP Act as a matter of law.
705 F.2d at 716; see Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, -,
218 S.E.2d 342, 346 (1975) (proof
of fraud necessarily constitutes violation of § 75-1.1).
36. 705 F.2d at 716; see supra note 28 (violations of UTP Act entitles injured parties to
treble damages).
37. 705 F.2d at 717. The Atlantic Purchaserscourt noted that courts normally liberally
construe Rule 54(c). Id at 716; see Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 803 (4th Cir.)
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did not entitle Stella Maris to treble damages, the Fourth Circuit held that
the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to allow Stella Mars
to amend its complaint pursuant to Rule 15(a) to include a treble damage
claim.38
Prior to the Atlantic Purchasersdecision, the Fourth Circuit had utilized
its discretion under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to deny statutory
claims for damages under state substantive law. For example, in McLeod v.
Stevens," the Fourth Circuit held that the propriety of an amendment adding
a claim for statutory damages to a complaint requesting only equitable relief
depended on whether the defendants had received actual prior notice of the
plaintiff's claim for statutory damages."n McLeod was a diversity action
governed by South Carolina law.4" In McLeod, the plaintiff minority
shareholder sought an injunction to restrain transfer of defendants' stock and
cancellation of stock allegedly issued illegally."' At the conclusion of trial on
the request for equitable relief, the plaintiff orally moved to amend her complaint to request compensatory and punitive damages pursuant to South
Carolina statutory law.43 The district court allowed the amendment pursuant
to rule 15(b) which allows a party to amend his pleadings to conform to the
evidence. 4 The Fourth Circuit vacated the subsequent award of compensatory
and punitive damages on the ground that the defendants had not received

(rule 54(c) presumes that court will award appropriate relief on basis of facts proved at trial),
cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971). The Atlantic Purchaserscourt, however, asserted that rule
54(c) does not entitle a prevailing party to relief which would so prejudice the opposing party
that injustice would result. 705 F.2d at 716; see United States v. Marin, 651 F.2d 24, 31 (1st
Cir. 1981) (failure to request particular relief may unjustly prejudice opposing party); Robinson
v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d at 803 (substantial prejudice to opposing party limits grant of relief
pursuant to rule 54(c)). Specifically, the Atlantic Purchaserscourt stated that fundamental fairness
required a plaintiff to notify the opposing party of the possibility of unusual statutory relief
prior to the plaintiff's damages claim pursuant to a verdict. 705 F.2d at 717.
38. 705 F.2d at 717.
39. 617 F.2d 1038 (4th Cir. 1980).
40. Id. at 1040.
41. Id. at 1039.
42. Id. at 1040.
43. Id.; see S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-9-90, -11-210, -21-150, -21-160, -21-170 (Law Co-op.
1976) (statutory provisions for shareholders' rights).
44. 617 F.2d at 1040; see FED. R. Civ. P. 15(b). Rule 15(b) expressly provides that a party
may move to amend his pleadings to conform to the evidence even after judgment. See FED.
R. Civ. P. 15(b). Additionally, rule 15(b) provides that the opposing party may object at trial
to evidence that would prejudice him. See FED. R. Civ. P. 15(b); McLeod, 617 F.2d at 1040-41.
In Atlantic Purchasers,Stella Mars sought only to amend its complaint pursuant to Rule 15(a).
705 F.2d at 715. If Stella Mars also had sought to amend its complaint pursuant to rule 15(b),
the district court could have addressed the issue of post-judgment amendment in the context
of the express provision for such late amendment in rule 15(b). See FED. R. Civ. P. 15(b). Under
rule 15(b), the district court further could have considered whether Stella Maris' evidence would
have allowed the defendants to object to Stella Maris' evidence as outside the pleadings. See
id. By attempting to amend the complaint pursuant to rule 15(a) rather than rule 15(b), Stella
Mars therefore forfeited an opportunity to have the district court examine more closely the merits
of the UTP Act claim.
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actual prior notice of the plaintiff's damages claims. '5 The Fourth Circuit re-

jected the plaintiff's contention that the evidence supporting the plaintiff's
equitable claim necessarily supported an award of statutory damages pursuant
to rule 54(c).11 As in Atlantic Purchasers,the Fourth Circuit in McLeod deter-

mined that an award of statutory damages following trial on a different cause
of action would unfairly prejudice the defendants.4 7 The McLeod court also
concluded that the admission of evidence supporting the original cause of ac-

tion could not be treated as implied consent to a trial on the statutory damages
issue merely because the evidence also happened to provide evidence of the
48
statutory violation.
The Fourth Circuit's reasoning in Atlantic Purchasersfollows the McLeod
court's decision." Both the plaintiff in McLeod and the plaintiff in Atlantic
Purchaserssought recovery on a legitimate cause of action and won the relief
requested. 5 The Fourth Circuit refused additional relief to the respective plain-

tiffs in Atlantic Purchasersand McLeod because the timing of the plaintiff's
reliance on an express statutory provision that would increase the defendant's

liability precluded the defendants from directly defending themselves on the
possible increase in liability."
While the majority in Atlantic Purchasersbased its decision on the prejudice to the defendants that would result from a post-verdict amendment
to the original complaint, the dissent examined court decisions construing the
applicability of the UTP Act provisions. 2 The dissent focused on the North

45. 617 F.2d at 1041.

46. Id. at 1040.
47. Id. at 1041; see Atlantic Purchasers,705 F.2d at 716-17. In McLeod, the Fourth Circuit
stated that the plaintiff's failure to amend her complaint to include a claim for statutory damages
prior to the conclusion of trial amounted to an election of an equitable remedy. 617 F.2d at 1041.
48. 617 F.2d at 1040-41. The McLeod court conceded that the opposing party's failure
to object to evidence with respect to the proposed amended complaint amounted to an indication
of implied consent to try the issue of statutory damages. Id. (citing 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1493 (1971)). Both the McLeod court and the Atlantic
Purchaserscourt, however, held that the defendants did not actually consent explicitly or implicitly to evidence of statutory damages even though the evidence of the plaintiff's original claim
also constituted evidence of the statutory claim. See Atlantic Purchasers,705 F.2d at 716; McLeod,
617 F.2d at 1040.
49. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text (discussion of McLeod).
50. See Atlantic Purchasers,705 F.2d at 715-16; McLeod, 617 F.2d at 1040; cf. Holt Civic
Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 65 (1978) (federal court should not dismiss meritorious constitutional claim because complaint seeks one remedy rather than another plainly appropriate
remedy). In Atlantic Purchasers,Stella Maris sought treble damages in addition to its commonlaw claims. 705 F.2d at 714-15. The jury's special verdict and judgment in Stella Maris' favor
indicated that Stella Mars' common-law claims were plainly appropriate. See id. at 715-16.
51. See 705 F.2d at 716-17; cf. Monod v. Futura, Inc., 415 F.2d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir.
1969) (court described post-trial motion to conform pleadings to evidence as afterthought not
entitling plaintiffs to relief under rule 54(c)).
52. 705 F.2d at 719-20 (Bryan, J., dissenting). See Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 540-41,
276 S.E.2d 397, 399 (1981) (trial judge determines whether jury's findings of fact constitute violation of § 75-1.1 as matter of law); State ex rel. Edmisten v. J.C. Penney Co., 292 N.C. 311,
319, 233 S.E.2d 895, 900 (1977) (§ 75-16 damages are remedial and punitive); Hardy v. Toler,
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Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Hardy v. Toler," in which the plaintiff
requested actual and punitive damages, as well as treble damages under sec5
The Hardy court stated
tion 75-16 of the UTP Act, in his initial complaint4.

that the plaintiff's evidence and the parties' stipulations warranted recovery
based on fraud.5 Although the Hardy court held that the defendant's fraud6
was not sufficiently outrageous to entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages,'

the court held that proof of fraud necessarily constituted a violation of the
UTP Act and therefore entitled the plaintiff to treble damages.5 7 In Atlantic

Purchasers,the dissent noted that the jury's findings with respect to the defendants' misrepresentations established the existence of the elements of fraud."'
The dissent concluded that the finding of fraud therefore entitled Stella Maris
to treble damages as a matter of law regardless of the insufficiency of the

pleadings.

9

The dissent further maintained that the defendants had received

ample notice of possible substantial liability through Stella Maris' allegation

of fraud in the pleadings, 60 which repudiated their claims of prejudice resulting
from a treble damage award."
The Atlantic Purchasersdecision reveals the continuing trepidation with
which the Fourth Circuit approaches the far reaching provisions of the UTP

Act. 62 The broad nature of the proscription against unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in section 75-1.1 may account for the Fourth Circuit's reluctance
to grant treble damages relief in the absence of state court construction of
section 75-1.1.63 The North Carolina courts, however, have established specific

definitions of the terms "unfair" and "deceptive" on which the Atlantic Purchasers court could have relied to determine that the defendants' actions con288 N.C. 303, 309, 218 S.E.2d 342, 346 (1975) (proof of fraud necessarily establishes violation
of § 75-1.1).
53. 288 N.C. 303, 218 S.E.2d 342 (1975).
54. See 705 F.2d at 718 (Bryan, J., dissenting); 288 N.C. at
55. 288 N.C. at __, 218 S.E.2d at 344.

-,

218 S.E.2d at 343.

56. Id.
57. 288 N.C. at -, 218 S.E.2d at 346. The Hardy court held that proof of the defendant's fraud based on the facts stipulated by the parties established a violation of § 75-1.1 as
a matter of law. Id. at-,
218 S.E.2d at 347. The Hardy court consequently granted the plaintiff's request for § 75-16 treble damages pursuant to the defendant's violation of § 75-1.1. Id.
at

-,

218 S.E.2d at 347.

58. 705 F.2d at 719 (Bryan, J., dissenting).
59. Id. The dissent in Atlantic Purchasersnoted that the jury's function in assessing violations of § 75-1.1 consists of finding the facts that establish whether a defendant has violated
§ 75-1.1 Id. The court then determines whether the jury's findings establish a violation of § 75-1.1
as a matter of law. Id. The dissent further noted that once a violation of § 75-1.1 has been
established, § 75-16 mandates an award of treble damages. Id.; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16,
supra note 28 (violation of UTP Act mandates award of treble damages).
60. 705 F.2d at 720, 721 (Bryan, J., dissenting).
61. 705 F.2d at 721 (Bryan, J., dissenting).
62. See supra note 16 (Fourth Circuit's reluctance to recognize violations of UTP Act in
commercial context).
63. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 (1977); see Aycock, North Carolina Law on Antitrust
and Consumer Protection, 60 N.C. L. Rv. 205, 223 (1982) (North Carolina court decisions

gradually will define equitable concept of unfair and deceptive trade practices).

1984]

FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

stituted a violation of the UTP Act." Furthermore, the North Carolina Supreme
Court expressly has held that proof of fraud constitutes a violation of section
75-1.1 and warrants an award of treble damages. 65 As the Atlantic Purchasers
dissent noted, Stella Maris pleaded the circumstances constituting fraud with
particularity pursuant to Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and provided proof of fraud, which the defendants failed to deny during the
trial. 66 Thus, despite the absence of express notice to the defendants of possi-

ble treble damage liability, the defendants were apprised of the substantial
accusations against them. 67 In considering the defendants' claim of prejudice
resulting from an award of treble damages, however, the Atlantic Purchasers
court neither held the defendants responsible for knowledge of North Carolina
court decisions specifically stating that proof of fraud constitutes a violation

of the UTP Act, nor considered whether notice of possible treble damages6
liability was substantially different from notice of possible punitive damages.
The Atlantic Purchasersjury's special verdict fairly met the requirements
69
of the North Carolina decisions regarding unfair and deceptive acts and fraud.
Although the North Carolina courts have not specifically required that a plaintiff claim a violation of section 75-1.1 in his complaint, the North Carolina
Supreme Court has established that a trial court must award treble damages
pursuant to section 75-16 once a jury finds that a defendant has violated the
UTP Act.70 Because Stella Mars pleaded fraud in the complaint 7' and the
Atlantic Purchasersjury found that the defendants had in fact committed
fraud,7" the district court should have awarded Stella Mars treble damages

pursuant to the mandate of section 75-16."1 In fact, the Atlantic Purchasers
court conceded that the defendants' actions would have constituted a viola64. Marshall v. Miller, 203 N.C. 539, -,
276 S.E.2d 397, 403 (1981). According to the
North Carolina Supreme Court, a practice is unfair when it offends established public policy
and when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious
to consumers. Id. (citing Johnson v. Insurance Co., 300 N.C. 247, 263, 266 S.E.2d 610, 621
(1980)). A practice is deceptive if the practice has the capacity to deceive. Id. Proof of a deceptive
practice does not require proof of actual deception. Id.
65. Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 309, -,
218 S.E.2d 342, 346, 347 (1975); see supra
notes 53-57 and accompanying text (Hardy held that proof of fraud establishes violation of §
75-1.1). North Carolina courts and federal courts construing North Carolina law customarily
cite Hardy for the proposition that proof of fraudulent acts or practices establishes a violation
of § 75-1.1.See United Roasters, Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 485 F. Supp. 1049, 1059 (E.D.N.C.
1980), aff'd, 649 F.2d 985 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1054 (1981); Johnson v. Phoenix
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 44 N.C. App. 210,-__, 261 S.E.2d 135, 144 (1979), rev'd on other grounds,
300 N.C. 247, 266 S.E.2d 610 (1980).
66. See 705 F.2d 719 (Bryan, J., dissenting).
67. See id.
68. See id. at 717.
69. See id.; supra note 64 (North Carolina Supreme Court's construction of unfair and
deceptive acts and practices).
70. See Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 547, 276 S.E.2d 397, 402 (1981).
71. See 705 F.2d at 714.
72. See id at 716.
73. See N.C. Gmx. STAT. § 75-16 (1977); supra note 19 (state law governs disposition of
substantive matters in federal court diversity action).
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tion of section 75-1.1, thus entitling Stella Mars to treble damages under7 secto apply the statute. 4

tion 75-16 if the Fourth Circuit had been willing
In refusing to apply North Carolina court decisions construing section
75-1.1, the Fourth Circuit apparently relied on the failure of North Carolina
courts to require a trial judge to apply the UTP Act provisions at any stage
of the proceedings once the facts establish a violation of section 75-1.1.71 The

Atlantic Purchaserscourt viewed Stella Maris' treble damages claim as prejudicial to the defendants. 76 By focusing on the timing of the treble damage

request rather than the facts that established a violation of the UTP Act, the
Fourth Circuit utilized the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to demonstrate
disapproval of Stella Maris' post-verdict treble damages request." Although

federal courts customarily liberally construe the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, ' 8 the Fourth Circuit held that the prejudice to the defendants which
would result from trebling Stella Maris' damage award following a full trial

and verdict on the common-law fraud and breach of express warranty issues
74. 705 F.2d at 716.
75. See id.; Trebles, supra note 16, at 119-61 (discussion of implementation of § 75-1.1).
In Atlantic Purchasers,the Fourth Circuit determined that the timing rather than the substance
of Stella Maris' claim for treble damages resolved the issue of § 75-1.1 applicability. See 705
F.2d at 716-17. The Atlantic Purchaserscourt held that Stella Maris' failure to request statutory
treble damages prior to the jury's verdict unfairly prejudiced the defendants. Id. The Fourth
Circuit therefore agreed with Stella Maris' contention that the application of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure resolved the treble damages issue. Id. at 716; see supra note 19 (Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure govern procedural issues in federal court diversity actions).
76. 705 F.2d at 717.
77. Id. at 716-17. The Atlantic Purchaserscourt refused to apply rule 54(c) because Stella
Mars' failure to request statutory treble damages until after the jury verdict so prejudiced the
defendants that granting treble damages would amount to an injustice. See id. at 716 (citing
United States v. Marin, 651 F.2d 24, 31 (1st Cir. 1981)). In Main, the First Circuit affirmed
the district court's award of damages even though the plaintiff's complaint requested only declaratory
relief. 651 F.2d at 31. The plaintiffs in Marin sought invalidation of the defendant's interest
in a lease. Id. at 24. The First Circuit held that evidence of the defendants' bad faith and knowledge
of lease irregularities entitled the plaintiffs to damages pursuant to rule 54(c) as well as to invalidation of the lease. Id. at 31. The Marin court upheld the discretionary nature of the district
court's decision to award relief pursuant to rule 54(c). See id. The decisions in Atlantic Purchasers and Marin provide evidence that circuit courts are reluctant to find that district courts
abused their discretion in granting or denying post-judgment relief pursuant to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. See Monod v. Futura, Inc., 415 F.2d 1170, 1174 (10th Cir. 1969) (affirming
district court's denial of plaintiff's motion to conform pleadings to evidence pursuant to rule
15(b) and motion to amend and alter judgment pursuant to rule 59(e)); Northern Oil Co. v.
Socony Mobil Oil Co., 347 F.2d 81, 83-84 (2d Cir. 1965) (affirming district court's grant of
plaintiff's motion to conform pleadings to evidence pursuant to rule 15(b)); Rental Corp. of
America v. Lavery, 304 F.2d 839, 842 (9th Cir. 1962) (affirming district court's cancellation of
lease pursuant to rule 54(c) in addition to plaintiff's request for damages for breach of lease).
But see Strauss v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 404 F.2d 1152, 1156 (2d Cir. 1968) (district court abused
discretion in granting defendant's motion because defendant's delay in successfully moving for
amendment of pleadings pursuant to rule 15(a) effectively foreclosed plaintiff's options for relief).
78. See Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 803 (4th Cir. 1971) (court has duty
to grant appropriate relief on the basis of facts proved at trial), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006
(197 ).
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outweighed Stella Mars' interest in a post-verdict award of treble damages
pursuant to rule 54(c). 719 Thus, while both acknowledging its obligation to apply
substantive North Carolina law and recognizing that the defendants' acts
violated section 75-1.1,8 the Atlantic Purchaserscourt declined to follow North
Carolina decisions specifically construing the UTP Act.' The Fourth Circuit
essentially rejected the UTP Act's broad provisions by applying a strict exception to the liberal promises of rule 54(c). 82
In Atlantic Purchasers,the majority's characterization of the nature of
treble damage relief further signifies the Fourth Circuit's reluctance to grant
treble damages.8 3 The majority summarily dismissed the contention that section 75-16 entitled Stella Maris to a trebling of both actual and punitive damages
awarded by the district court jury.84 Relying on North Carolina court decisions characterizing the UTP Act's treble damages provision as punitive in
nature,88 the Fourth Circuit stated that an award of both punitive damages
on the common-law fraud claim and treble damages pursuant to the UTP
Act would constitute overlapping remedies.8 6 Essentially, the majority implied
that the North Carolina legislature intended the provisions of the UTP Act
to replace or provide an alternative to common-law causes of action.' Under
the majority's reasoning, therefore, a plaintiff may claim either punitive

79. See 705 F.2d at 717; supra note 77 (Stella Maris not entitled to rule 54(c) relief that
would prejudice defendants).
80. 705 F.2d at 716.
276 S.E.2d 397, 403 (1981) (defining "un81. See Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, -,
fair" and "deceptive" practices); Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 309, 218 S.E.2d 342, 346 (1975)
(fraud constituted violation of § 75-1.1).
82. See 705 F.2d at 716-17.
83. See 705 F.2d at 716 n.4.
84. Id. In Marshall v. Miller, the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that when one
course of conduct gave rise to a common-law cause of action as well as a cause of action for
violation of § 75-1.1, plaintiff could not recover damages for both causes of action. 47 N.C.
App. 530, _ 268 S.E.2d 97, 103 (1980), modified on other grounds, 302 N.C. 539, 276 S.E.2d
397 (1981).
276 S.E.2d 397, 402 (1981) (§ 75-16 is
85. See Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, -,
partially punitive in nature because treble damages deter future violations of UTP Act); accord
State ex rel. Edmisten v. J.C. Penney Co., 292 N.C. 311, 319, 233 S.E.2d 895, 900 (1977).
86. 705 F.2d 716 n.4 (citing In re "Dalkon Shield" Litigation, 526 F. Supp. 887, 899 (N.D.
Cal. 1981)). In Dalkon Shield, the district court held that a defendant's right to protection against
multiple punishment in the form of overlapping damages awards for the same act comported
with due process. 526 F. Supp. at 899. The Atlantic Purchasersdecision may rely on the Dalkon
Shield court's assertion that common sense dictates that a defendant should not be subjected
to multiple civil punishment for a single act. See id. at 900; Marshall v. Miller, 47 N.C. App.
530, 268 S.E.2d 97, 103 (1980) (error for trial judge to award treble damages for UTP Act violation and actual damages for breach of contract because quadruple damages result), modified
on other grounds, 302 N.C. 539, 276 S.E.2d 397 (1981).
87. See 705 F.2d at 716 n.4 (plaintiff is not entitled to damages on both common-law and
statutory causes of action); 1969 Legislation, supra note 6, at 898 (North Carolina legislature
enacted § 75-1.1 to remedy previously ineffective methods of dealing with deceptive trade practices under North Carolina law).
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damages on a common-law cause of action or section 75-16 treble damages,
which incorporate common-law punitive damages."
The Atlantic Purchasersdissent, however, characterized the provisions of
the UTP Act as a statement of public policy against unfair or deceptive acts
or practices." 9 The dissent reasoned that the legislature intended to enforce
public policy against unfair or deceptive acts or practices whether or not relief
was available under the more restrictive common-law causes of action. 90 The
dissent supported its assessment of legislative intent by relying on a North
Carolina decision which held that the North Carolina legislature did not intend for treble damages to operate as a penalty for purposes of bringing a
UTP Act claim within the statute of limitations. 9'
In Atlantic Purchasers, the Fourth Circuit's characterization of treble

damages under the UTP Act as at least partially punitive is similar to the
Fourth Circuit's previous characterization of treble damages in UnitedRoasters
v. Colgate-PalmoliveCo. 92 In United Roasters, the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of North Carolina ruled that treble damages under
the UTP Act are punitive in nature. 93 The Fourth Circuit upheld the district

88. See 705 F.2d at 716 & 716 n.4.
89. Id. at 719 (Bryan, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 719-20 n.3 (Bryan, J., dissenting). In Atlantic Purchasers,the dissent noted that
a plaintiff need not prove intentional wrongdoing on the part of the defendant to recover under
§§ 75-1.1 and 75-16. Id. at 720 n.3. The dissent noted, however, that a defendant must prove
intentional wrongdoing to recover punitive damages. Id. The dissent therefore reasoned that the
two remedies are not mutually exclusive. Id.
91. Id. at 720; see Holley v. Coggin Pontiac, Inc., 43 N.C. App. 229, 237, 259 S.E.2d
1, 6, petition for discretionary review denied, 298 N.C. 806, 261 S.E.2d 919 (1979). In Holley,
the North Carolina Court of Appeals addressed a conflict between the one-year statute of limitations for actions that may subject a defendant to a penalty and the four-year statute of limitations for UTP Act actions. 43 N.C. App. at 237, 259 S.E.2d at 6; compare N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 1-54(2) (1977) (actions that may subject defendant to penalty must be brought within one year)
with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16.2 (1979) (civil actions under UTP Act must be brought within
four years). In Holley, the trial court had granted the defendant's motion for summary judgement, in part because the plaintiff had not brought his action for actual, punitive, and treble
damages within the § 1-54(2) one-year statute of limitations. See N.C. App. at -, 259 S.E.2d
at 3; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-54(2) (1977). The North Carolina legislature, however, may have enacted
the four-year statute of limitations for UTP Act actions in order to encourage private enforcement without considering the punitive aspects of § 75-16. See Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539,
-,
276 S.E.2d 297, 403-404 (1981) (§ 75-16 encourages private enforcement of UTP Act violations by making actions more economically feasible).
92. 705 F.2d at 716 n.4; see United Roasters v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 649 F.2d 985, 987
n.1 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1054 (1981); supra text accompanying notes 83-88 (discussion of North Carolina courts' characterization of nature of treble damages).
93. 485 F. Supp. 1049, 1059 (E.D.N.C. 1980), aff'd, 649 F.2d 985 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1054 (1981). In United Roasters, plaintiff brought a § 75-1.1 claim against the defendant based on defendant's alleged breach of contract. Id. at 1052. The jury found that the defendant breached an implied contractual obligation, but that the defendant had not intentionally
injured the plaintiff. Id. at 1058. The United Roasterscourt noted that North Carolina law does
not permit punitive damages for breach of contract absent intentional wrongdoing. Id. at 1059.
The United Roasters court stated that because § 75-16 is punitive in nature, a jury must find
intentional wrongdoing before the court can conclude that defendants have violated § 75-1.1 Id.
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court's decision in United Roasters,94 further characterizing the plaintiff's claim

for breach of contract and contract termination in violation of section 75-1.1
as alternative theories of recovery. 95 The Atlantic Purchasersdecision follows
the United Roasters holding that a plaintiff may recover damages either on

a common-law breach of contract cause of action or pursuant to the provi96
sions of the UTP Act, but not on both common-law and statutory claims.
The Atlantic Purchasersdecision is also consistent with recent decisions in
the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits, which have declined
to apply statutory treble damages as an additional award of damages concurrent with common-law recovery. 97 Because the North Carolina legislature
enacted the UTP Act to remedy previously ineffective methods of dealing with
deceptive trade practices under North Carolina law, the treble damages provision consistently would encompass the punitive9 damages awards previously
available under North Carolina common law.
Atlantic Purchaserswas a diversity action in which existing North Carolina
law governed the disposition of substantive issues. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit's decision has no binding effect in construing the parameters of the UTP
Act. 99 The Atlantic Purchasers decision, however, signifies that the Fourth

Circuit will not apply the UTP Act beyond what North Carolina courts clearly have dictated.'9 0 Thus, to insure recovery under the UTP Act, plaintiffs

in the Fourth Circuit must present statutory claims expressly in their complaints or prior to the conclusion of trial.'"' The Fourth Circuit appears unwilling otherwise to apply the treble damages mandate of the UTP Act.
LouisE J. BROWNER
94. 649 F.2d 985 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1054 (1981). In affirming the United
Roasters district court's decision, the Fourth Circuit did not consider the district court's determination that § 75-16 is punitive in nature. See id. at 987 n.l.
95. Id. at 990.
96. See Atlantic Purchasers,705 F.2d at 716 n.4; United Roasters, 649 F.2d at 990; supra
note 84 (recovery on both common-law and statutory actions proscribed under North Carolina law).
97. See Superturf, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 660 F.2d 1275, 1283 (8th Cir. 1981) (trial court
cannot award both treble and punitive damages for Sherman Act claim and concurrent state
law claim for tortious interference with business relations); Bailey Employment System, Inc. v.
Hahn, 655 F.2d 473, 478 (2d Cir. 1981) (trial court must determine whether defendant's admissions and trial court's findings of fact warrant application of damages under unfair trade practice
statute); City of Marshall, Tex. v. Bryant Air Conditioning, 650 F.2d 724, 725 (5th Cir. 1981)
(claims for breach of warranty and violations of Deceptive Trade Practices Act represent alternative grounds of recovery), Royal Business Machines v. Lorraine Corp., 633 F.2d 34, 49 (7th
Cir. 1980) (treble damages are punitive in nature and additional punitive damages award constitutes double punishment); Edwards v. Travelers Ins. of Hartford, Conn., 563 F.2d 105, 123
(6th Cir. 1977) (plaintiff not entitled to statutory treble damages when recovery based on commonlaw action for inducement to breach contract).
98. See supra notes 85 & 87.
99. 705 F.2d at 714, 716; see Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (federal courts
do not have power to declare law of states).
100. See supra notes 62-75 and accompanying text (Atlantic Purchaserscourt's reluctance
to apply UTP Act.).
101. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text (consequences of Stella Maris' failure
to mention UTP Act prior to jury verdict).

